Racial Preferences Under Admissions Constraints: Evidence from the U.S. Naval Academy*

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Abstract

The United States Naval Academy (USNA) has strict rules on how to conduct admissions, especially with regard to race. Using data from five admissions cycles made public through a recent admissions lawsuit, we document substantial racial preferences for all non-White groups throughout the admissions process despite these constraints. After removing applicants who are recruited athletes or coming from one of the Naval Academy's preparatory programs, only 1 in 3 current Black admits would gain admission absent racial preferences, compared to 2 in 3 Hispanic and Asian American admits. Further, we find racial preferences in parts of the admissions process where the use of race is specifically prohibited under Federal law.

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1 Introduction

For decades, state and federal law have imposed various constraints on racial preferences in college admissions. Because universities remain committed to enrolling racially diverse classes, they have an incentive to look for workarounds when legal constraints limit the direct use of race. For example, after Proposition 209 banned the use of race in California admissions, universities in the University of California system responded by shifting more weight towards grade point average and low-income status and away from standardized tests (Antonovics and Backes, 2014).[1] And in the first year following the 2023 Supreme Court rulings in *SFFA v. Harvard* and *SFFA v. UNC*, top universities such as Duke, Princeton, and Yale saw virtually no drop in their Black and Hispanic enrollment.[2] These patterns suggest that formal prohibitions against the use of race in admissions may be limited in their effects.

In this paper, we examine admissions to the United States Naval Academy (USNA). USNA operates under strict rules regarding its admissions system that, in principle, severely limit the use of race in admissions. This makes it an ideal case study for the broader phenomenon of institutional workarounds. Using data publicly revealed in the *SFFA v. USNA* lawsuit, we show how USNA was able to incorporate large racial preferences despite these restrictions.

The admissions process at USNA, and indeed at all U.S. service academies, has a number of unique features compared to civilian U.S. universities. One of these features is that, to be admitted, an individual must receive a nomination, the vast majority of which are congressional nominations.[3] Each U.S. Representative and Senator has a certain number of "vacancies" to fill at USNA and puts forth a "slate" of nominations (usually up to 10 per vacancy). Whoever fills a particular congressional vacancy at USNA is named the "slate winner."

[1] UCLA also adopted a "holistic" admissions process in 2006 that critics alleged was designed to boost minority enrollment while nominally complying with Proposition 209 (Sander and Taylor, 2012; Groseclose, 2014).

[2] This occurred despite these universities arguing in an amicus brief that "no race-neutral alternative presently can fully replace race-conscious individualized and holistic review to obtain the diverse student body *Amici* have found essential to fulfilling their missions" (Brown University et al., 2022).

[3] Aside from government officials ("congressional nominations"), nominations can also come from military officials ("service-connected nominations").

Congressmen may select whether their slate is rank-ordered or "competitive." If competitive, nominees are ranked by a formulaic score called the Whole Person Multiple (WPM).[4] The highest-ranked qualified nominee by WPM is supposed to be admitted, though some discretion is allowed in close calls.[5] Nominees who do not win a slate have two additional chances at admission—as Qualified Alternates (QA) or Additional Appointees (AA). QAs comprise the qualified applicants with the top 150 WPM scores nationwide among those who received a congressional nomination from a source other than the US Vice-President, do not win a congressional slate, and do not decline admission, and are explicitly supposed to be race-neutral. AAs are completely discretionary and the only place in which USNA is explicitly allowed to consider race.

Like its elite civilian counterparts (Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom, 2022b, 2024; El Fatmaoui and Ransom, 2025), USNA enrolls a large number of varsity athletes. Recruited athletes, or "Blue Chip Athletes" (BCAs), make up over 18% of the admitted class. Another group given special consideration is applicants from the Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS) and other prep schools, who also comprise over 18% of admits, with some overlap with BCAs. Admission for both groups is effectively automatic, conditional on being qualified. Both BCA and NAPS admissions are key avenues through which USNA achieves racial diversity.

We analyze USNA admissions data for its Classes of 2023–2027 (primarily comprised of high school seniors applying in the fall of 2018–2022). Our sample includes 70,508 applicants of which 14,545 had complete applications, received a nomination, and were deemed medically and physically qualified.[6] There are 6,906 admits, for an overall admit rate of 47.5%.

We identify racial preferences using a selection-on-observables approach (Altonji, Elder,

[4]The WPM is a deterministic function of test scores, grades, athletic and nonathletic extracurricular activities, and teacher recommendations. The WPM formula also includes subjective Recommendations of Admission Board (RAB) points but these are a small fraction of the total score. Regarding test scores, our sample spans the COVID-19 period when test score requirements were temporarily waived. We account for this by estimating separate statistical models by exemption regime.

[5]In order to be qualified, applicants must pass medical and physical fitness exams and receive an acceptable overall rating by the USNA Admissions Board. Close calls are defined as within a 4,000 WPM-point band.

[6]44,129 of the original 70,508 applicants fail to complete their application. This high attrition rate is likely driven by the nomination requirement.

and Taber, 2005; Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom, 2023) and estimate logistic models of admission that include many covariates.[7] These models fit the data extremely well, which limits concerns of omitted variable bias (McFadden (1979) pseudo $R^2 = 0.507$, comparable to the model fit achieved in Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom (2023)). Among applicants who are neither BCA nor NAPS alumni, we document large and significant preferences for all non-White groups. Among previously admitted Black students, only 33% would have been admitted under race-neutral policies. The corresponding figures are 69% for Asians, 67% for Hispanics, and 70% for Native Americans.[8]

Given the statutes governing admissions decisions, how can such large racial preferences be implemented? The answer is that USNA is able to take advantage of flexibility in the process. For example, a high-WPM applicant may be nominated by two different congressmen. This potentially leaves USNA with discretion as to which congressional slate to fill with the candidate. The most important flexibility is how USNA interprets the rules when an offer of admission is declined. Internal documents reveal the list of who is earmarked to be a QA at various points in the admissions cycle. We can see how the WPM cutoff score for being listed as a QA (the QA cutoff) changes over time. We show that all applicants who are qualified and have a WPM score above the highest QA cutoff are admitted. This is untrue for the final QA cutoff: there are many qualified applicants with WPM scores between the final QA cutoff and the highest QA cutoff that are rejected. Substantial racial preferences exist here: the admit rate for qualified White applicants between the two cutoffs is less than 30%, while the similar rate for Black applicants is over 86%. With 45% of QA enrollees having scores between the two cutoffs, the overall effect of racial preferences is substantial.

While these results show large racial preferences, preferences for other groups are even larger drivers of the representation of Black students. Only 40% of Black admits are neither BCAs nor prep alumni, compared to 65% of Hispanic admits, 71% of White admits and 80% of Asian admits. Among enrollees who are neither BCAs nor prep alumni, Blacks comprise

[7] Our models include applicant demographics, socioeconomic status, neighborhood and high school characteristics, WPM components, fitness test score, Blue and Gold Officer interview score, and detailed variables about the number and types of nominations received and the applicant's WPM ranking within their slates.

[8] These figures land in between comparable numbers for Harvard and UNC out of state (Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom, 2023). USNA's preferences in favor of Asians contrasts sharply with documented discrimination against Asian Americans at Harvard and other elite universities (Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom, 2022a).

just 6% of the class. The BCA and prep channels—where there are no constraints on racial preferences—account for 60% of Black enrollees compared to just 29% of White enrollees.

Using our estimated models, we conduct several counterfactual simulations. We show that, holding fixed all else about the USNA admissions process except race, the share of admits who are Black would decrease from 10.5% to 8.1%. The decline for Asians (14.3% to 12%) and Hispanics (12.5% to 11%) would be only slightly smaller. However, we show that a regime that eliminated admissions preferences for BCAs and NAPS students would further reduce the Black admit share to 3.8% while leaving the corresponding shares for the other minority groups virtually unchanged.

Our study contributes to several literatures. Most directly, it extends work on affirmative action bans and their consequences (Chan and Eyster, 2003; Hinrichs, 2012, 2020; Antonovics and Backes, 2014; Bleemer, 2022) by examining how institutions adapt when facing formal constraints through multiple admission channels.

It also builds on the broader literature examining racial preferences in college admissions. This includes foundational work on the effects of affirmative action (Arcidiacono, 2005), studies of academic mismatch (Arcidiacono et al., 2011; Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Spenner, 2012; Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz, 2016), and recent empirical analyses of holistic admissions processes (Espenshade, Chung, and Walling, 2004; Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom, 2023; Riehl, 2024). Our work is particularly related to studies documenting how preferences operate through multiple channels, including athletic recruitment and legacy admissions (Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom, 2022b, 2024; El Fatmaoui and Ransom, 2025).

Our study also contributes to research on U.S. military academies by providing the first systematic analysis of how racial diversity is achieved through the admissions process. Prior work has documented achievement gaps by race at West Point (Cestau et al., 2023) and examined how racial and gender diversity affects various outcomes (Carrell, Hoekstra, and West, 2019; Huntington-Klein and Rose, 2018; Kofoed and McGovney, 2019), but the mechanisms producing this diversity have received little attention. Understanding these mechanisms is particularly important given that many studies leverage the random assignment of students at these institutions to examine peer effects (Lyle, 2007, 2009; Carrell, Fullerton, and West, 2009; Carrell, Sacerdote, and West, 2013; Brady, Insler, and Rahman, 2017), professor qual-

ity (Carrell and West, 2010; Carrell, Page, and West, 2010), and other outcomes (Carrell, Malmstrom, and West, 2008; Carrell, Hoekstra, and West, 2011; Carrell, Maghakian, and West, 2011; Jones and Kofoed, 2020; Haggag et al., 2021; Patterson, Pope, and Feudo, 2023; Kofoed et al., 2024). Since the composition of admitted classes affects the pool of students available for random assignment, our findings provide important context for interpreting results of these studies. Additionally, Kotlikoff, Rahman, and Smith (2022) examine the impact of attending NAPS on USNA performance. This complements our finding that NAPS serves as a key channel for achieving racial diversity.

More broadly, our findings contribute to understanding how organizations respond to legal constraints and the limits of formal rules in achieving policy objectives.[9] The multi-channel nature of USNA's preferences demonstrates that institutions retain substantial discretion even under seemingly restrictive frameworks.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe USNA's admissions process in detail. Section 3 describes our data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 introduces the admissions models that we estimate, section 5 describes our main results and quantifies the impacts of various counterfactual admissions policies. In section 6, we explain the ways in which USNA works around existing constraints in order to implement racial preferences. Section 7 concludes.

2 USNA Application and Admissions Processes

Our data covers five cohorts of students who, if enrolled at USNA and graduated in four years, would do so in 2023–2027. During this period, admissions to USNA was governed by strict rules, which would seem to limit the role that race could play in admissions. In this section, we provide context for the rules that USNA is bound by, and then discuss areas where USNA is able to exercise more discretion than what appears available on the surface.[10]

[9] For example, Blattner, Farinha, and Rebelo (2023) study banks' strategic responses to regulatory capital requirements and show that organizations adapt to formal constraints in ways that may comply with the letter of the law while undermining its intent.

[10] This section relies heavily on section 2.3 of Trial Exhibit P218. Consult the original source for complete details.

2.1 Applications and Nominations

Like many universities, USNA requires its applicants to fill out an application and submit high school transcripts, standardized test scores, essays, and letters of recommendation. USNA applicants also must interview with a "Blue and Gold Officer" (BGO).

In addition to these more standard materials, military academies have requirements not typically found at other universities. To be qualified for admission to USNA, applicants must additionally (1) pass a medical exam; (2) pass a fitness exam; and (3) receive a nomination from a U.S. government official.

It is this last requirement that is especially influential. Most commonly, these nominating authorities are senators or congressmen, but they can also include high-ranking military officials, the President and Vice President of the United States, and the USNA Superintendent. Nominations from military officials are referred to as "service-connected" nominations and are typically related to prior military service on the part of the applicant or their family members.

2.2 Admissions Process

Once applications are complete, the USNA Admissions Board scores the applications, makes offers of admission, and selects which vacancies will be charged. To complete these last two steps, nominations are aggregated into "slates" which are groups of applicants nominated by the same authority (e.g., a specific senator, representative, or military official) who are all competing for a designated appointment slot at USNA, known as a "charge." Each nominating authority can nominate multiple candidates for their allocated slot(s), and these nominees collectively form that authority's "slate."[11] Admitted students who matriculate at USNA are then charged to the nominator's "vacancy."[12] Congressional nominators typically list

[11] During this period, congressmen could nominate up to 10 candidates per slot; this number varies for other nominating authorities.

[12] Congressional nominators have a certain number of charges that they are allowed. Vacancies refer to the case where the current number of charges is less than the maximally allowed number. For example, if each congressman were allowed up to five charges (i.e. a maximum of five enrolled USNA students from their district at any given time), but there were only three currently enrolled USNA students that were charged to a certain congressman in the past, then that congressman would have $5 - 3 = 2$ vacancies and could nominate two slates worth of applicants in the current admissions cycle.

nominees on a single slate, with at most one nominee to be selected to fill the corresponding vacancy.[13] USNA is not obligated to fill all available vacancies (Trial Exhibit P218, section 2.3.3). Service-connected admission channels typically involve a single slate from which multiple nominees can be admitted. As we discuss in detail below, there are three primary charging channels: (1) slate winner (either congressional or service-connected charges); (2) Qualified Alternate; and (3) Additional Appointee, with the latter two competing across slates.

Importantly, for the purposes of this analysis, charging is only seen upon matriculation; any preliminary charging decisions are overwritten in the data. Thus, the data do not show through which channel those who decline an admissions offer would have been charged.

2.2.1 Scoring of applicants

Whole Person Multiple In evaluating applications, USNA relies heavily on a proprietary metric called the Whole Person Multiple (WPM) which is meant not to consider race. The WPM is a formula that computes the weighted sum of scores on various academic and non-academic application components, including (1) highest SAT math and verbal scores; (2) high school class rank; (3) teacher recommendations; (4) athletic extracurriculars; and (5) non-athletic extracurriculars. Teacher recommendations and extracurriculars are assigned specific points depending on the boxes the teacher checks or the level of engagement with the extracurricular.[14] There is also a sixth component, known as Recommendations of the Admission Board (RAB), which is more subjective than the rest and is included as a way to adjust for unusual achievement or circumstances.[15]

In addition to the WPM, candidates are also scored on a fitness exam, the Candidate Fitness Assessment (CFA), and on their interview with a Blue and Gold Officer (BGO). The CFA aggregates scores on various activities such as the one-mile run and push-ups.

[13] Less commonly, a congressional nominator can have multiple vacancies, and can submit a single slate with multiple nominees to be selected, or can submit multiple slates of nominees, one for each vacancy, with up to one admit being selected through each.

[14] For teacher recommendations, this will include a rating, for example, of how easily the applicant makes friends (Trial Exhibit P218, pp. 13–14). For extracurriculars, a certain amount of points will be given for being, for example, student body vice president (Trial Exhibit P218, p. 14).

[15] RAB adjustments are voted on by the Admission Board.

2.2.2 Charging of applicants

Slate Winners In the first stage of admissions, congressional slate winners are selected. For congressional nominees, the nominator chooses between three possible selection methods: the "competitive method" (based primarily on WPM scores with a minimum threshold of 58,000 WPM points), the "principal numbered-alternate method" (using a ranked list from nominators), or the "principal competitive-alternate method" (designating a principal candidate with others primarily competing on WPM). If a principal or an ordered list is specified, USNA is supposed to defer to that ordering in selecting an admit from among qualified nominees. Notably, USNA retains flexibility by reassigning admits across slates, particularly when candidates receive multiple nominations from different sources.[16]

Qualified Alternates Following slate winner determination, the second stage fills up to 150 slots with "Qualified Alternates" (QA)—qualified congressional nominees[17] with the highest WPMs who were not slate winners.

Additional Appointees The third stage involves "Additional Appointees" (AA), where the Board of Admissions exercises considerable discretion and explicitly considers race as a factor. QA and AA constitute separate charging channels from the congressional or service-connected ones.

2.3 Special applicants

There are two groups of applicants who are effectively automatically admitted to USNA, conditional on meeting certain criteria (i.e. medical and fitness qualification). These are a particular set of recruited athletes (called "Blue Chip Athletes" or BCAs) and graduates of USNA's one-year preparatory programs, the largest of which is the Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS).[18]

[16]For example, a particularly strong applicant could be the top WPM score on the slates of both her senator and congressman. Since a single person cannot take up two charges, USNA has discretion in how to charge the vacancy not charged to the focal applicant. See p. 17 of Trial Exhibit P218 for an illustrative example.

[17]A nomination from the Vice President does not, however, suffice for eligility for QA admission.

[18]Aside from NAPS, there are two other prep programs: Foundation and Civilian Prep. NAPS constitutes over 80% of all prep students, followed by Foundation at 15%. It is unclear if Civilian Prep are guaranteed

Prep students slightly complicate the admissions process because they are repeat applicants by definition. That is, applicants who do not gain admission to USNA may be offered a slot at one of the prep programs rather than being outright rejected. This is an important channel through which USNA can exercise discretion in admissions decisions, since admissions to NAPS are not governed in the same way that admissions to USNA are. Moreover, NAPS students are required to enlist in the Navy before matriculating at NAPS. This means that NAPS alumni can be charged on service-connected slates, which have much greater capacity than congressional slates.

2.4 Flexibility in the Process

There is substantial flexibility in the process beyond the sequential slate-clearing procedure described above. This is evident through five key mechanisms: (1) discretionary assignment of QAs that bypasses strict WPM score rankings; (2) replacement selections for declined offers that do not necessarily adhere to WPM rankings—with evidence suggesting race may influence these decisions; (3) NAPS admissions that operate outside the WPM framework; (4) strategic management of vacancies where slots remain unfilled despite qualified applicants, and congressional nominations that can be selectively charged; and (5) admissions decisions that contradict WPM rankings.[19]

These discretionary practices in effect make USNA's actual process more closely mirror that of its civilian counterparts. While all admitted students ultimately fall into one of four categories—congressional/service-connected slate winners, Qualified Alternates, Additional Appointees, or declining the offer—the determination process for each type potentially involves administrative discretion rather than adherence to a prescribed formula or set of regulations. This flexibility allows USNA to exert racial preferences in places that otherwise would seem to rule out the possibility.

admission, but it is a small fraction of the prep pool regardless.

[19] Trial documents also show that there is discretion in determining which candidates are tagged as Early Notify by the Board of Admissions as well as which candidates are granted medical waivers (Trial Exhibit P218, section 6.1).

3 Data and Descriptive Statistics

3.1 Data

In this section we describe our data, highlighting the characteristics of applicants as they move through the admissions process. Note that we no longer have access to the individual-level applicant data from USNA. As such, the findings in this paper rely exclusively on information available in the publicly released versions of the expert witness reports. These documents are publicly available at the URLs in the bibliography entries.

3.1.1 Admission steps

We begin by examining the share of each racial group who clear the different USNA admissions hurdles outlined in Section 2. To do so, however, necessitates constructing racial groups. We combine race and ethnicity variables into mutually exclusive groups using a hierarchical approach: individuals are classified as Black if they report any Black or African American ancestry regardless of ethnicity; Hispanic if not Black and they report Hispanic or Latino ethnicity regardless of other races; Native American/Hawaiian if neither Black nor Hispanic and they report any American Indian/Alaska Native or Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander ancestry; Asian if they do not fall into the previous categories and report Asian ancestry; White if they report only White race and non-Hispanic ethnicity; and Declined/Missing if they declined to report any race or ethnicity information.[20]

Table 1 reports application completion rates, nomination rates, and medical and physical qualification rates. Overall, about 37% of applicants complete their application. Of these, 81% are nominated. Of nominees, about 72% are deemed medically qualified and 95% pass the candidate fitness assessment (CFA). These overall rates mask some heterogeneity by race. Black and Hispanic applicants have slightly lower completion rates (30% and 33%, respectively). Black applicants who complete their application also have a much lower nomination rate (70% compared to 80% or higher for all other groups).[21] Medical qualification

[20] This classification results in better admissions predictions than one that allows for additive effects in race and ethnicity and treats multiracial applicants as receiving a separate effect. See Trial Exhibit P518 Section 3.3 and Table 3.2F.

[21] As we will discuss further in Section 2.3, this is driven by not needing a nomination to enter one of the

rates are highest for Black applicants at 78%, in part because they are more likely to receive a medical waiver.[22] Over 92% of each racial group passes the fitness exam.

Our data then consists of 70,508 applicants across the Classes of 2023–2027, of which 7,009 are admitted. This corresponds to an admit rate of 9.9%. However, once we remove foreign applicants, those with incomplete/withdrawn applications or who did not receive a nomination, and those who fail to pass the medical or fitness examinations or who have missing WPM components, we arrive at a sample of 14,545 applicants and 6,906 admits. This admit rate of 47.4% is much higher than the raw 9.9% rate publicly reported.

3.2 Special Applicants and Admissions Channels

As discussed in Section 2.3, there are two groups of special applicants who are effectively admitted with certainty: Blue Chip Athletes (BCAs) and alumni of prep programs. Moreover, the two groups are not mutually exclusive. Table 2 shows the distribution of the 6,906 admits by combinations of these two group identifiers. The main result from Panel B is that Black admits disproportionately enter through both of these special status categories. 47.6% of Black admits come from prep programs, while almost 33% are BCA. The corresponding percentages for Hispanic admits are 28.3% and 10%. For White admits, they are 12.1% and 20.2%. Prep admits who are also BCAs constitute 20.4% of Black admits but less than 4% for each other major racial and ethnic group.

Special status matriculants are also admitted through different channels than their counterparts. Panel B of Table 3 shows that over 87% of both congressional slate winners and Qualified Alternates come from the group of enrollees who are neither BCAs nor prep alumni. By contrast, almost 78% of Additional Appointees come from one of the special categories, with non-prep BCAs 42% of the total. The service-connected channel is dominated by prep alumni (almost 61%). Panel D shows that average WPM scores vary widely by special status. Combined BCA-Prep enrollees have the lowest average WPM scores (57,213), followed by Non-BCA prep (61,257), then BCA Non-Prep (62,944) with non-special enrollees scoring

naval academy's preparatory programs. The largest of these, the Naval Academy Preparatory School, had a Black enrollment share above 35%.

[22]Table 6.3R of Trial Exhibit P222 (2024) shows that 21% of Black applicants receive a medical waiver (and therefore are treated as medically qualified) compared to 11% of White applicants.

much higher on average at 68,261.

Table 4 restricts our analysis to the 3,727 Non-BCA, Non-Prep enrollees to see how race interacts with admissions channels for those who are not automatically admitted. We document a stark pattern for Additional Appointees (Panel C): Blacks and Hispanics constitute over 52% of these slots despite being only 18.1% of matriculants, while Whites are 17.8% of Additional Appointees despite being 61.7% of matriculants. Among Black enrollees, 37.0% are Additional Appointees versus just 2.3% of White enrollees (see Panel B). Panel D shows significant differences in average WPM scores (net of RAB points) by race even within admission channel. Indeed, Black enrollees overall have lower WPM (net of RABs) scores than any admission channel/non-Black group combination, despite large differences in WPM scores across admissions channels.

3.3 Descriptive Statistics

Table 5 presents summary statistics by race and admission status for the 12,304 non-BCA, non-prep applicants who completed their applications, received nominations, and passed fitness and medical requirements. The overall admission rate in this subsample is 38.4%, with substantial variation by race: 36.1% for Whites, 37.3% for Blacks, 35.9% for Hispanics, and 54.8% for Asians.

Admits of every race are socioeconomically advantaged compared to rejects, across a variety of measures. Admits are more likely to be legacies, to have attended private high schools, to have attended high schools with higher rates of peer four-year college attendance; and to come from families with annual income above $80,000. Admits are also much less likely to be first-generation college students.[23]

Admits of every race are also stronger on each measure of academic and non-academic preparation and total WPM score. However, there are substantial racial gaps in preparation among admits. For example, both White and Asian rejects have comparable average SAT math scores than Black admits (654 and 658 vs. 657). White rejects are essentially as well

[23]As noted in Footnote 45 of Trial Exhibit P218, rates of first-generation college are very low and are more consistent with having had neither parent obtain any postsecondary schooling as opposed to having had neither parent complete a four-year degree.

prepared as Black admits in terms of SAT verbal, CFA score, and WPM athletic score.

3.4 WPM analysis

To better compare applicants of different races holding preparation fixed, we first sort applicants into deciles based on their WPM score. We use the Class of 2023 WPM formula weights to avoid component reweighting that occurred in response to COVID-19-related test-optional policies. We remove the subjective, potentially race-conscious RAB component and focus on the WPM net of RAB points. We calculate deciles separately by class year to account for any differences in applicant pool composition across admissions cycles. We then consider what the distribution of applicants is across deciles within race/ethnic groups, as well as the admit rate of applicants in a given decile-race group.

Tables 6 and 7 present a descriptive summary of USNA admissions for applicants who are neither Blue Chip Athletes nor coming from prep programs.[24] Black and Hispanic applicants are overrepresented in the bottom WPM deciles, while White and Asian applicants are overrepresented in the top deciles. For all groups, admission rates increase nearly monotonically with WPM score. Notably, deciles 3–8 reveal large differences in admissions likelihood between White and non-White applicants. For example, in decile 5, White applicants have a 20% chance of admission, Hispanic applicants have a 30% chance, Asian applicants have a 38% chance, and Black applicants have a nearly 60% chance. By decile 10 these differences are much smaller, but White applicants continue to have a lower chance of admission (88.5%) compared to non-Whites (91% for Hispanics, 95% for Blacks, and 96% for Asians). While not conclusive, these patterns suggest differential admission standards across racial groups.

4 Admissions Models

While the descriptive patterns regarding the role of race in USNA admissions are stark, they may be the result of differences in characteristics that also matter for admission to USNA. In this section we describe our model of USNA admissions, the estimates of which will also us to quantify the role of race after conditioning on other relevant characteristics.

[24] See Online Appendix Tables A.5–A.6 for the entire applicant pool.

Denote $Y_{it} = 1$ (0) if the ith applicant in cohort t was admitted (rejected). We model USNA admissions decisions as resulting from a ranking of the applicants that depends on a set of observed characteristics X_{it} and unobserved characteristics ε_{it}. USNA admits in order of the ranking until the class is filled. The coefficients on the X_{it}'s, β, give the weights on the observed characteristics when forming the ranking. The ranking is based on the latent index of each of the applicants in a particular cohort, Y_{it}^*, and is given by:

$$Y_{it}^* = X_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{1}$$

where $Y_{it} = 1[Y_{it}^* > 0]$ indicates admission and $\varepsilon_{it} \sim \text{Logistic}(0, 1)$. Embedded in X_{it} are cohort specific intercepts which ensure that the predicted number of admits in each year exactly matches what is seen in the data.

This ranking occurs over applicants who are at the margin of admission or rejection. We remove applicants who do not receive any nominations, as well as those who fail to meet the criteria for medical and physical fitness as these are necessary conditions for admission. We also remove Blue Chip Athletes and current prep program students as these admissions outcomes are nearly automatic. The primary sample includes 12,304 applicants over five class years.

We estimate two classes of models: a *pooled* model which includes all admissions cycles and limited interactions between the pre- and post-COVID indicators and the controls and a *cohort* model which allows all the coefficients to vary across the pre- and post-COVID cohorts (Classes of 2023–24 and 2025–27) as the WPM formula changed across cohorts to accommodate an SAT-optional policy and may have impacted the effects of other controls as well.

We estimate both the pooled and cohort models with different sets of controls to test the sensitivity of our estimates of racial preferences. Each of the models includes race/ethnicity indicators, gender, and class year fixed effects.

Our preferred model includes many more demographic characteristics. These include legacy status and armed service status, as well as several measures of household and community demographics (first-generation college status, household income, percentage of students

from i's high school attending 4-year colleges, percentage of students from i's high school qualifying for free/reduced price lunch status, private high school attendance, and ZIP code income measures). It also includes CFA and BGO interview scores, an indicator for receiving any RAB points for honors or AP/IB coursework, as well as the battery of six WPM components (SAT math and verbal scores, standardized rank in high school class, athletic and non-athletic extracurricular scores, and high school teacher recommendation score).

Our preferred model also includes a number of variables designed to capture the peculiarities of USNA's admissions process such as different levels of competition across congressional slates and the different ways in which the congressman may rank the applicants. We include indicators for at least one congressional nomination, multiple congressional nominations, nomination from service-connected sources, as well as indicators for which types of slates i appeared on (competitive, principal competitive-alternate, and principal numbered-alternate), whether i was nominated as the principal, and the total number of nominations i received.

We distinguish between what we call *Type 1* and *Type 2* congressional slates: Type 1 slates are those that are competitive (either purely competitive or principal competitive-alternate) and that have only one vacancy. Type 2 slates are competitive, but with two vacancies. We include indicators for being nominated on at least one of each type of slate, and scoring within 4,000 WPM points of the top scorer on each type of slate.[25] We also include the log of the number of competitors (plus 1) on each type of slate, and the minimum of the average WPM across all slates of each type. Finally, we include an indicator for if i was the top WPM scorer and more than 4,000 WPM points above all other competitors on at least one slate (of either congressional type).

5 Estimates of Racial Preferences in Admissions

We now present estimates of the admissions models described in the previous section. We then use the estimates of the models to calculate the effects of racial preferences, showing

[25] 4,000 is the band of WPM points in which USNA considers two applicants to be close enough to be considered tied on WPM (see Trial Exhibit P218, p. 15).

substantial preferences for non-White applicants and especially for Black applicants.

5.1 Logit Coefficient Estimates

In Table 8 we present estimates of some of the key pooled logit admissions models for USNA. Full results for both the pooled and pre- and post-COVID models are in Online Appendix Tables A.8–A.10. We note that the fit of each of Models 3–8 is exceptionally strong, with our preferred model (Model 6) achieving a McFadden Pseudo R^2 of 0.51. These are only slightly lower than the preferred admissions models for Harvard (0.56) and UNC out-of-state (0.59) in Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom (2023). We prefer Model 6 because it includes a wide variety of covariates without overcontrolling. Model 7 includes RAB points which may capture racial preferences. Model 8 restricts to observations not missing any of the family background measures which leaves out too many observations.

Table 8 shows the evolution of racial preference coefficients as we progressively add more covariates. The coefficients on Black increase from near-zero in Model 1 (0.025) to 2.958 in our preferred Model 6. This shows that racial preferences become more apparent once we account for differences in academic credentials and other admissions factors. Similar patterns emerge for other minority groups, though the magnitudes differ. The coefficients on Asian rise from 0.720 to 1.450 and Hispanic from -0.020 to 1.195.

Notably, we find no evidence of preferences for first-generation college students or low-income applicants in our preferred models. In Model 6, the coefficients on both first-generation status and household income below $80,000 are statistically zero.[26]

To provide an interpretable scale for the racial preference coefficients in our pre-COVID models (Classes of 2023–24), we translate them to SAT point equivalents. In Model 5 from Table A.9, the combined SAT coefficients (Math + Verbal) sum to approximately 2.096 per 100 SAT points on each section (i.e., +200 overall score). The Black coefficient of 2.540 in the same model translates to roughly 242 additional overall SAT points ($= 2.540/2.096 \times 200$). Similarly, the Asian coefficient of 1.614 corresponds to 154 SAT points, and Hispanic to 92 SAT points.[27]

[26]Recall that USNA's definition of first-generation status is more consistent with neither parent having attained any postsecondary education.

[27]The analogous calculations for the 2025–2027 classes are 551 SAT points for Blacks, 228 for Asians and

5.2 Three Measures of Racial Preferences

We present three complementary measures of racial preferences: (1) average marginal effects, (2) admit rates for previous admits, and (3) capacity constraint counterfactuals. Table 9 reports the first two measures.

5.2.1 Average Marginal Effects for USNA admissions

Consistent with the SAT benchmarks in the previous section, our AMEs point to substantial racial preferences at USNA for all non-White groups. In terms of AME magnitudes, Black applicants have the largest preferences, followed by applicants who are Asian, Native American or Hawaiian, and Hispanic, respectively. The AME for Black applicants implies that their status quo admit rate is nearly three times higher than what their admit rate would be without preferences (37.4% versus 12.9%). The similar numbers for each of the other minority groups imply a roughly 45% increase in their admissions rates, rather than a tripling. Each of these groups would have more than twice as large admissions chances as Blacks if all applicants were treated as White.

Our AMEs also point to heterogeneity by admissions cycle. Preferences for Black and Hispanic applicants increased substantially in the 2025–27 cycles. The AME for Blacks increased from 18.6pp in the 2023–24 cycles to 29.4pp off a similar base rate in both time periods. For Hispanics, the AME more than doubled from 7.4pp to 15.2pp, but the no-preferences admissions rate increased by 5.1pp, implying that Hispanic applicants were stronger in the later period and therefore more on the margin on admission. These increased preferences may be due to the increased nationwide attention to racial disparities in the wake of the killing of George Floyd, which occurred between the 2024 and 2025 cycles. However, it is impossible for us to rule out other explanations because the COVID-19 pandemic also occurred between these cycles, which in turn led to changes in the WPM formula.

231 for Hispanics. The increase in these numbers is due to a combination of an increase in racial preferences and a decrease in the weight that SAT scores carry in admissions.

5.2.2 Admit rate for previous admits

Beyond AMEs, we also calculate another measure of racial preferences: the admit rate for previous admits. That is, given someone was admitted under an admissions regime that included racial preferences, what would their admissions chances be in the absence of racial preferences?

Denote $Y \in \{0, 1\}$ if the applicant was rejected or admitted when racial preferences were in place and $Y' \in \{0, 1\}$ as admission outcomes when racial preferences are removed. Following Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom (2023), for a minority applicant with characteristics X_i, the probability of admission under no racial preferences conditional on being admitted with racial preferences can be expressed as:[28]

$$P(Y' = 1|Y = 1, X_i) = \frac{P(Y' = 1|X_i)}{P(Y = 1|X_i)} \tag{2}$$

We report the admit rate for previous admits when racial preferences are removed in the final columns of Table 9 and include comparable results from Harvard and UNC (Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom, 2023) for comparison. We estimate that roughly two-thirds of Black admits (67.3%) would have been turned away if they were instead treated as White. The similar number for each of the other minority groups is about one-third (32.7% for Hispanics, 31.3% for Asians, and 30.0% for Native Americans/Hawaiians). For Black and Hispanic applicants, these estimates fall between the comparable numbers for Harvard and UNC in-state as reported in Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom (2023).[29]

5.2.3 Capacity constraints

Our results to this point have documented substantially large racial preferences in USNA admissions for all non-White groups. We now conduct counterfactual exercises that assess the extent to which the USNA admitted class would change if race were not allowed to be used in admissions, as well as comparing these to removing other preferences such as those

[28] The expression follows from Bayes' rule and noting that, for a beneficiary of racial preferences, $P(Y = 1|Y' = 1) = 1$.

[29] Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom (2022a) found penalties against Asian American applicants at Harvard.

for Blue Chip athletes and for those from prep programs.

To compute counterfactuals in the presence of capacity constraints, we use our preferred logit model from (1) and change the weight placed on observed characteristics in the counterfactual. Denoting a particular counterfactual as C, the new vector of coefficients would then be given by $\hat{\beta}^C$. For our counterfactuals that remove racial preferences, the coefficients on each of the race variables are set to zero, implying that all applicants are treated as White. We then adjust the intercept term for each cohort t by Δ_t^C to hold fixed the average admissions probability for each cohort following Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom (2023):

$$\overline{p}_t = \frac{1}{N_t} \sum_{i=1}^{N_t} \frac{\exp\left(X_{it}\hat{\beta}^C + \Delta_t^C\right)}{1 + \exp\left(X_{it}\hat{\beta}^C + \Delta_t^C\right)} \tag{3}$$

For groups that we remove from our admissions model due to deterministic admissions (e.g. BCAs and prep students), we take their admissions outcomes as given.

Our counterfactuals also consider cases where preferences for BCAs and prep students are removed. In these cases, we assume that these applicants would be treated as their non-BCA and non-prep program counterparts, calculating their probability of admission as in Equation 3.

Table 10 shows how several counterfactual admissions policies would affect the racial representation of USNA's admitted class. Compared to the status quo (row 2), removing racial preferences alone (row 3) increases the White share of admits by 6.3 percentage points, with drops of 2.3, 2.4, and 1.5 percentage points for Asian, Black, and Hispanic applicants, respectively. The movement from 10.5% to 8.1% share of admits who are Black may appear small given that 67.3% of Black admits who were not BCA or coming from the prep pool would be rejected absent racial preferences. The reason the drop is small is because 60.1% of Black admits are either BCA or prep pool applicants (see Table 2, Panel B) whose admissions decisions are held fixed in this simulation. Indeed, removing racial preferences as well as BCA and prep pool preferences (row 7) would drop the Black share of admits to 3.8%, a substantial impact given the status quo of 10.5%.

The other rows of Table 10 show various combinations of removing racial, BCA, and

prep school preferences. A key feature is that the effect of removing BCA or prep school preferences is much larger when racial preferences are also removed. Just removing prep school preferences would decrease Black enrollment by 1.3 percentage points (row 2 minus row 11: 10.54%−9.28%). But removing prep school preferences after also removing racial preferences further decreases Black enrollment by an additional 2.1 percentage points (row 3 minus row 6: 8.14%−6.07%). The magnified effect when both are removed results from Black applicants from prep schools being partially shielded from the loss of prep school preferences by still benefiting from racial preferences.

Which sports preferences are removed also matters for the racial composition of the admitted class. BCA preferences for basketball and football primarily benefit Black applicants; BCA preferences in other sports primarily benefit White applicants. Consider the case where racial, prep school, and all BCA preferences are all removed (row 7). Restoring preferences for BCA in basketball and football (row 8) would increase the share of admits who are Black by 2.1 percentage points off a base of 3.8 percentage points (5.92%−3.78%).

6 Racial Preferences and Admissions Channels

The results of Section 5 demonstrate that USNA employs substantial racial preferences for non-White applicants in order to manipulate the racial composition of its admitted class. A natural question is in which admissions channels these preferences are operating. In this section, we examine the mechanisms through which USNA implements these preferences despite operating under ostensibly restrictive admission protocols designed to limit institutional discretion.

We show that racial preferences are present in all four admissions channels: congressional slate winners, Qualified Alternates, Additional Appointees, and service slate winners. Indeed, for Black applicants, racial preferences are actually larger for Qualified Alternates than for congressional slate winners.

This is surprising given that race is supposed to play no role in the selection of Qualified Alternates. We then show that these preferences are driven by how USNA handles declined admission offers. While the initial list prior to any declines shows no racial preferences, sub-

stantial racial preferences emerge as the admissions cycle progresses and Qualified Alternate slots open up due to declined offers.

Finally, we show the substantial role that race plays in NAPS admissions. As discussed in Section 2.3, any racial preferences applied to NAPS admissions will automatically flow into USNA admissions the following year.

6.1 Admissions Channels

To examine how racial preferences affect each of the admissions channels, we develop and estimate a joint model of (1) the admission decision and (2) the charging decision. We implement this in the form of a nested logit model that generalizes Equation (1) by treating admissions as a two-stage process: (1) whether to admit an applicant; and (2) through which channel to charge that admission.

We modify Equation (1) to take on the nesting structure depicted in Figure 1 for those with congressional nominations.[30] The nesting structure can be specified in this way because the lowest WPM for a Qualified Alternate is always above the highest WPM for an Additional Appointee. So if an applicant with a congressional nomination in a particular cycle has a WPM at least as high as the lowest Qualified Alternate in that cycle, this applicant will, if admitted at all, either be admitted through the congressional slate winner or QA channel.

Denote the four admissions channels as CC (congressional slate winner), QA (Qualified Alternate), AA (Additional Appointee), and SC (service-connected). For channel $j \in \{CC, QA, AA, SC\}$, we specify the latent index index for admission as:

$$\tilde{Y}^*_{ijt} = Z_{it}\theta_j + \eta_{ijt} \tag{4}$$

where Z_{it} is the set of all the variables on the right hand side of (1). The latent index of being rejected (denoted by $j = R$) is normalized to zero. An applicant is admitted if $\{\max_j \tilde{Y}^*_{ijt}\} > 0$ and admitted through channel j if $\tilde{Y}^*_{ijt} > 0$ and $\tilde{Y}^*_{ijt} > \tilde{Y}^*_{ikt}$ for all $k \neq j$. Note that some elements of θ_j could be restricted to be zero for some of the j's.

[30] We model admissions of applicants with service-connected nominations as an independent binary logit because the two sets are almost perfectly disjoint. See Footnote 31.

If we assume the η_{ijt}'s yield nested logit probabilities, then we can express the probability of being admitted through channel j as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} P\left(j, \text{Admitted}|Z_{it}\right) &= \frac{\left(\sum_{k\neq R}\exp(Z_{it}\theta_k)\right)^{\sigma-1}\exp(Z_{it}\theta_j)}{\left(\sum_{k\neq R}\exp(Z_{it}\theta_k)\right)^{\sigma}+1} \\ &= \left(\frac{\left(\sum_{k\neq R}\exp(Z_{it}\theta_k)\right)^{\sigma}}{\left(\sum_{k\neq R}\exp(Z_{it}\theta_k)\right)^{\sigma}+1}\right)\frac{\exp(Z_{it}\theta_j)}{\sum_{k\neq R}\exp(Z_{it}\theta_k)} \\ &= P(\text{Admitted}|Z_{it})P(j|\text{Admitted}, Z_{it}) \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

where σ is the degree of correlation among errors in the admissions nest.

In practice, we estimate the parameters of (5) in multiple stages. First, we estimate models for the probability of the admission channel conditional on being admitted—the $P(j|\text{Admitted}, Z_{it})$ component of (5). Note that for those who decline an offer, we do not observe their admissions channel so they are not included in the admissions-channel logits. Second, we estimate the unconditional admissions vs. rejection decision as well as the parameter σ—the $P(\text{Admitted}|Z_{it})$ component of (5). We can include those who decline the offer in this second-stage logit by forming the inclusive value term from the first-stage logit. This assumes that the channel through which decliners would have been charged follows the same pattern as matriculants, conditional on their observables.

We partition the sample based on congressional nomination status, as this largely determines which admission channels are feasible. Those with congressional nominations have access to the CC/QA/AA channels, while those without congressional nominations only have access to the SC channel. In all, we use four separate logit models to estimate the parameters of (5).

The first logit model has as its dependent variable whether the applicant was charged as a QA and uses the subsample of applicants who are QA-eligible (i.e. receiving a congressional nomination and scoring above the final QA WPM cutoff). This captures discretion in charging as a congressional slate winner versus as a QA. Second, we estimate a logit model where the dependent variable is whether the applicant was charged as an AA and uses the subsample of applicants who are AA-eligible (i.e. receiving a congressional nomination but

scoring below the QA WPM cutoff). This captures discretion in charging as a congressional slate winner versus as an AA. The third logit model considers whether the applicant was admitted at all and uses estimates of the first two logit models to calculate the inclusive value term for the nesting structure. The subsample is all applicants who received a congressional nomination.[31] Finally, we estimate a fourth logit model that is nearly identical to the third, but which includes only those applicants who did not receive a congressional nomination. This fourth model does not include any inclusive value term because there is no nesting—matriculants through the service-connected channel are only charged in one way.

We report all estimates of the parameters in (5) in Online Appendix Table A.11. Columns (1) and (2) show racial preferences for Qualified Alternates and Additional Appointees *relative* to the racial preferences for congressional slate winners. Column (2) reveals substantial racial preferences for Additional Appointees at USNA above and beyond those for congressional slate winners, which is unsurprising given USNA's stated practices. The coefficient for Blacks is roughly double those for Asians and Hispanics. Surprisingly, column (1) demonstrates larger racial preferences in the QA channel compared to the congressional channel, at least for Black applicants. It is also interesting to note that several coefficients on WPM components have positive and significant effects on the QA margin, but not at all on the AA margin. This, again, validates our model given how QAs and AAs are defined.

Congressional channel results in column (3) show large and positive racial preference coefficients, with the coefficient for Blacks being roughly twice as large as each of the other minority groups, which in turn are roughly equal to each other in magnitude. These coefficients show racial preferences for congressional slate winners. Racial preferences for Qualified Alternates and Additional Appointees can be calculated by taking the coefficients on race for slate winners and adding σ, the coefficient on the inclusive value term, times the corresponding racial preferences in columns (1) and (2); racial preferences in columns (1) and (2) are on top of the preferences of those for congressional slate winners. These results show that race matters conditional on having a congressional nomination, but it matters even more for

[31] Congressional nomination status effectively partitions the sample, as those with congressional nominations are almost never admitted through service channels, while those without are virtually always admitted through service channels. In our estimation sample, only 8 applicants with congressional nominations were admitted through service channels, while only 1 without a congressional nomination was admitted as an Additional Appointee. See Section 4.2.5 of Trial Exhibit P218 for more details.

Qualified Alternates and Additional Appointees than for congressional slate winners. The latter is as expected; the former is surprising given that race is not supposed to be used in the QA channel. Finally, column (4) examines applicants without congressional nominations and shows patterns that are comparable to congressional channels. These results indicate that USNA employs racial preferences across all admission channels.[32]

6.2 Qualified Alternates

Why would we see larger racial preferences for Qualified Alternates than congressional slate winners when race is supposed to play no role for Qualified Alternates? Indeed, Qualified Alternates are notable for the fact that USNA should have zero discretion at all because the objective WPM-based selection criteria are specified by federal statute in 10 U.S.C. §8454(b)(5).[33] We now investigate how race enters into the Qualified Alternate decision despite these guidelines.

A first hint that race plays a role for Qualified Alternates can be found in Online Appendix Table A.7, which shows racial differences in WPM scores for those charged as QAs. For example, White QAs have an average WPM score (net of RAB points) of 72,021 while the averages for the three other minority groups are between 941 and 2,408 WPM points fewer.

In principle, this gap could be due to compositional differences, with racial gaps in average WPMs but not marginal ones. In particular, once candidates ineligible for other reasons (such as failing the medical or physical examination, or being rated Not Qualified by the Board of Admissions) are removed, QA admission rates should be 100% for individuals above a given year's threshold and 0% below, irrespective of race.

Figure 2 confirms this is not the case, and that the legal requirement to have a common WPM score threshold for being charged as a QA in any cohort is violated. Below the minimum WPM score of those charged as a QA in a given year, QA admission rates are tautologically 0% for all races. But in any given 1,000-point WPM bin locally above this

[32]Estimates of the nested logit produce similar average marginal effects of race to our preferred logit admissions model. See Online Appendix Table A.12.

[33]Under 10 U.S.C. §8454(b)(5), the Secretary of the Navy appoints 200 (until 2023, 150) midshipmen (i.e., matriculants) "selected in order of merit" from Qualified Alternates—those nominees not initially selected by their nominating sources (senators, representatives, etc.). The statute explicitly requires selection based on merit order established under §8456, leaving no room for subjective discretion in the selection process.

cutoff, Figure 2 shows that admission rates as a QA are substantially lower for QA-eligible White applicants than for QA-eligible non-White minority applicants, often dramatically so. For example, White QA-eligible applicants 0–999 WPM points above the year's observed minimum QA admit were admitted less than 20% of the time, while minority students in the same WPM range were admitted over 60% of the time.

We detail further evidence on this matter in Table 11. In this table, we differentiate between *initial* and *final* QA thresholds—i.e., the minimum WPM score above which all QAs are admitted.[34] This distinction is possible because internal USNA documents provided to SFFA recorded provisional QA cutoff scores at different points in each admission cycle. We deem the highest provisional cutoff observed over the course of each admissions cycle the *initial* QA threshold. Online Appendix Table A.13 shows the initial and final cutoffs for each admissions cycle, and the number of applicants charged as QA admits with WPM scores below the initial cutoff. The gap between initial and final cutoff scores ranges between 2,650 and 5,000 points across the admissions cycles.

While the racial distribution of applicants eligible for QA consideration appears similar above and below the initial WPM threshold, the racial composition of actual QA admits reveals a distinctly different pattern. For applicants with scores above the initial threshold, the racial distribution of admits is almost identical to that of the eligible applicant pool, consistent with a merit-based selection process prioritizing higher WPM scores (or more specifically, the close to 100% admission rate in this subgroup). However, for those below the initial threshold, substantial disparities emerge: White applicants constitute 74.1% of eligible candidates but only 54.9% of eventual QA admits in this category, whereas the similar numbers for Asians go from 13.9% to 26.6% and for Blacks go from 2.6% to 5.7%. These differential selection rates for otherwise similarly situated candidates below the initial threshold—but above the final QA cutoff—suggest that race plays a substantive role in the QA selection process.

To further illustrate the role race plays in the selection of Qualified Alternates, we estimate logit models of the same form as (1), but which use "being admitted as a QA" as the

[34]The reason this distinction occurs is because provisional QA admits and congressional slate winners may decline their admissions offer, which forces the QA threshold down as the admissions process continues.

dependent variable. To do this, we first remove applicants who were admitted as congressional slate winners or who declined an admissions offer. We then focus on two subsamples of applicants: (1) those who are eligible for QA (i.e., who received a congressional nomination) who are not BCAs or prep students; and, further, (2) those whose WPM score is between their respective year's initial and final QA threshold. We report the full set of coefficient estimates in Online Appendix Table A.14. Our preferred models have respective McFadden Pseudo R^2 values of 0.833 and 0.441. Estimates of the race coefficients for our preferred models are extremely large and all above 2, with the coefficient on Black sometimes reaching above 4.

6.3 Racial Preferences at NAPS

To investigate whether USNA employs racial preferences in prep school admissions, we estimate a version of (1) that is adapted to NAPS admissions.[35] We do not use any information about nomination slates because NAPS admissions require neither a nomination nor any type of slate competition.

We estimate a similar set of specifications of Equation (1) on the subsample of applicants who are eligible for NAPS admission (see Panel B of Online Appendix Table A.1). The key differences are as follows: (1) we do not restrict to nominees since NAPS admission does not require a nomination; (2) we remove those who were admitted to USNA, Foundation Prep or Civilian Prep programs; (3) those who are eventually tagged as Blue Chip Athletes; and (4) the Class of 2027 application cycle.[36] This results in 7,307 applicants eligible for admission to NAPS across the Classes of 2023–2026.

The estimates of the logit admissions models to NAPS are displayed in Online Table A.15. Given the estimates of our preferred model, we calculate average marginal effects with

[35] We focus on NAPS for two reasons: (1) NAPS constitutes 80% of all prep students; and (2) NAPS requires students to be medically and physically qualified just as USNA does, whereas Foundation and Civilian Prep do not. This is because NAPS students formally enroll in the Navy, which requires medical and physical fitness. Additionally, NAPS alumni automatically qualify for service-connected nominations, which simplifies their charging process.

[36] Blue Chip Athletes are not labeled as such when being admitted to NAPS—the designation only appears for USNA admissions. This discrepancy requires us to drop the Class of 2027 due to an inability to identify which NAPS admits would become BCAs at USNA in the following year. See Section 4.3.1 of Trial Exhibit P218 for complete details.

the results displayed in Table 12. Racial preferences at NAPS are substantially larger than at USNA and tend to follow the same ordering of magnitudes. NAPS racial preferences are also much larger during the post-2024 classes for all minority groups. Our estimates imply that Black NAPS applicants experience a 3.6–3.8-fold increase in their admissions rates to NAPS relative to similarly situated Whites. For Hispanics and Asian, it is 1.6–2.2-fold.

7 Conclusion

This paper has examined the extent to which USNA complies with federal statutory restrictions on racial preferences. We document the magnitude of racial preferences, as well as the specific mechanisms through which USNA employs them. We estimate large admissions preferences for all non-White groups. Preferences for Black applicants are nearly twice as large as for the other non-White race groups. Focusing on those admits who were not recruited athletes or coming from one of USNA's prep programs shows that only one in three current Black admits would gain admission without racial preferences, compared to two in three for other minority groups. We show that racial preferences operate through multiple channels, including the supposedly merit-based Qualified Alternate process.

Our results indicate that, while USNA appears to be restricted in terms of where it can use race in the admissions process, it actually operates as if it has a substantial amount of discretion. Thus, while formal bans on using race may slightly limit its use, complete compliance requires eliminating discretionary loopholes and greater levels of monitoring.

The mechanisms documented here parallel similar patterns at civilian universities post-*SFFA*. While civilian universities are no longer supposed to use race in admissions, race can be inferred through personal essays, targeted recruitment (Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom, 2022c), and other channels. Indeed, several elite universities saw virtually no drop in Black and Hispanic enrollment directly after the *SFFA* ruling. This suggests that these new restrictions on racial preferences, like earlier state-level bans, may fail without either eliminating institutional discretion or fundamentally restructuring how admissions operate.

Recent policy developments underscore both the persistence and fragility of these practices. In May 2025, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth issued a directive ending the use of

race in service academy admissions (U.S. Department of Defense, 2025). This marked the first executive action to directly address the preferences documented in this paper. Notably, this policy shift occurred despite Navy leadership having argued strenuously during trial that racial diversity was a "mission-critical national security interest" (Document 150, p. 13). The abrupt reversal—from characterizing diversity as mission-critical to abandoning race-conscious admissions entirely—underscores the risk of treating contested, thin, or selectively cited empirical claims as a sufficient basis for policies carrying substantial legal ramifications.

Throughout both the defense of preferences and their subsequent elimination, institutional claims have relied on anecdotes and appeals to intuition rather than systematic analysis of how racial composition affects military outcomes. This pattern of evidence-free policymaking—whether used to justify or eliminate preferences—highlights the need for empirical research on the actual effects of admissions policies on institutional performance.

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Figures and Tables

Table 1: Application Pipeline Rates by Race (%)

		Conditional on Completion		
			Conditional on Nomination	
Race	Completion Rate	Nomination Rate	Medical Pass Rate	Physical Pass Rate
White	39.12	82.16	70.77	95.65
Hispanic	32.64	82.78	70.43	94.08
Asian	35.49	81.44	75.40	95.43
Black	29.71	70.41	78.09	93.01
Native Am./Hawaiian	33.28	83.60	70.68	92.23
Declined/Missing	37.85	79.50	69.69	96.32
Overall Rate	36.57	81.09	71.78	95.14
Overall N	69,570	25,441	20,631	20,631

Source: Authors' calculations from Tables 3.1R–3.3R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Sample restricted to domestic applications. Rightward columns add more conditions to the sample.

Table 2: Frequencies and Shares (%) of Admits by Race and Applicant Pool

	Non-BCA, Non-Prep	BCA, Non-Prep	Non-BCA, Prep	BCA Prep	Total
Panel A: Frequencies					
Asian	791	78	111	6	986
Black	290	91	198	148	727
Declined/Missing	75	6	8	3	92
Hispanic	557	62	220	24	863
Native American / Hawaiian	118	10	36	18	182
White	2,897	667	338	154	4,056
Total	4,728	914	911	353	6,906
Panel B: Row Percentages					
Asian	80.2	7.9	11.3	0.6	100.0
Black	39.9	12.5	27.2	20.4	100.0
Declined/Missing	81.5	6.5	8.7	3.3	100.0
Hispanic	64.5	7.2	25.5	2.8	100.0
Native American / Hawaiian	64.8	5.5	19.8	9.9	100.0
White	71.4	16.4	8.3	3.8	100.0
Total	68.5	13.2	13.2	5.1	100.0
Panel C: Column Percentages					
Asian	16.7	8.5	12.2	1.7	14.3
Black	6.1	10.0	21.7	41.9	10.5
Declined/Missing	1.6	0.7	0.9	0.8	1.3
Hispanic	11.8	6.8	24.1	6.8	12.5
Native American / Hawaiian	2.5	1.1	4.0	5.1	2.6
White	61.3	73.0	37.1	43.6	58.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Table 3.8R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Sample includes only USNA admits. BCA refers to Blue Chip Athlete; Prep refers to NAPS, Foundation, or Civilian Prep.

Table 3: Frequencies, Shares (%) and Average WPM of Enrollees by Admission Channel and Applicant Pool

	Non-BCA, Non-Prep	BCA, Non-Prep	Non-BCA, Prep	BCA Prep	Total
Panel A: Frequencies					
Congressional Slate Winner	2,532	135	193	26	2,886
Qualified Alternate	655	74	20	1	750
Service-connected	243	97	321	208	869
Additional Appointee	297	560	364	111	1,332
Total	3,727	866	898	346	5,837
Panel B: Row Percentages					
Congressional Slate Winner	87.7	4.7	6.7	0.9	100.0
Qualified Alternate	87.3	9.9	2.7	0.1	100.0
Service-connected	28.0	11.2	36.9	23.9	100.0
Additional Appointee	22.3	42.0	27.3	8.3	100.0
Total	63.9	14.8	15.4	5.9	100.0
Panel C: Column Percentages					
Congressional Slate Winner	67.9	15.6	21.5	7.5	49.4
Qualified Alternate	17.6	8.5	2.2	0.3	12.8
Service-connected	6.5	11.2	35.7	60.1	14.9
Additional Appointee	8.0	64.7	40.5	32.1	22.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Panel D: Average WPM net of RAB Points					
Congressional Slate Winner	68,011	65,494	62,578	59,598	67,454
Qualified Alternate	71,685	69,879	70,618	72,393	71,480
Service-connected	65,976	61,651	59,854	56,905	61,061
Additional Appointee	64,710	61,637	61,279	57,094	61,846
Total	68,261	62,944	61,257	57,213	65,740

Source: Table 3.9R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Sample includes only USNA enrollees. BCA refers to Blue Chip Athlete; Prep refers to NAPS, Foundation, or Civilian Prep.

Table 4: USNA Enrollees by Nomination Source and Race/Ethnicity, Removing Blue Chip Athletes and Prep Pool

	Congressional Slate Winner	Qualified Alternate	Additional Appointee	Service-Connected	Total
Panel A: Frequencies					
Asian	351	140	80	38	609
Black	78	24	85	43	230
Hispanic	277	55	70	41	443
White	1,729	413	53	106	2,301
Total	2,532	655	297	243	3,727
Panel B: Row Percentages					
Asian	57.6	23.0	13.1	6.2	100.0
Black	33.9	10.4	37.0	18.7	100.0
Hispanic	62.5	12.4	15.8	9.3	100.0
White	75.1	17.9	2.3	4.6	100.0
Total	67.9	17.6	8.0	6.5	100.0
Panel C: Column Percentages					
Asian	13.9	21.4	26.9	15.6	16.3
Black	3.1	3.7	28.6	17.7	6.2
Hispanic	8.4	8.4	23.6	16.9	11.9
White	68.3	63.1	17.8	43.6	61.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Panel D: Average WPM net of RAB Points					
Asian	67,738	70,284	65,587	67,217	67,942
Black	65,116	69,318	63,118	63,508	64,513
Hispanic	67,338	71,228	65,437	65,186	67,320
White	68,300	72,363	64,773	66,984	68,817
Total	68,011	71,685	64,710	65,976	68,261

Source: Authors' calculations from Tables 3.10R–3.13R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Sample includes only USNA enrollees. We omit enrollees from sparse racial/ethnic groups but include them in totals. Thus, the figures in Panels A and C do not sum to the corresponding total row.

Table 5: Application Summary Statistics by Race and Admit Status, Removing Blue Chip Athletes and Prep Pool

	White			Black			Hispanic			Asian			Total		
Variable	Rejected	Admitted	Total	Rejected	Admitted	Total	Rejected	Admitted	Total	Rejected	Admitted	Total	Rejected	Admitted	Total
Admitted	0.00	100.00	36.11	0.00	100.00	37.28	0.00	100.00	35.91	0.00	100.00	54.78	0.00	100.00	38.43
Female	21.85	29.86	24.74	27.46	32.76	29.43	27.97	29.08	28.37	28.02	31.10	29.71	23.60	30.16	26.12
First generation college	3.57	1.86	2.95	8.81	5.52	7.58	12.58	6.46	10.38	8.73	4.55	6.44	5.72	3.11	4.71
Legacy	4.16	7.15	5.24	2.46	6.90	4.11	3.22	5.39	4.00	3.06	3.29	3.19	3.87	6.22	4.77
Blue Chip Athlete	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Applying from NAPS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Attended private high school	21.69	24.81	22.83	16.29	20.26	17.98	19.14	22.08	20.27	15.04	16.18	15.70	20.66	22.91	21.55
BGO interview rating: Top 5 pct	14.83	31.76	20.94	10.86	24.83	16.07	12.07	25.31	16.83	11.18	27.43	20.08	13.74	29.70	19.87
Family Income over $80,000	75.47	80.74	77.37	48.57	65.52	54.88	57.24	70.56	62.02	60.34	69.53	65.37	69.22	75.91	71.79
Received a congressional nomination	86.89	95.41	89.97	65.52	81.38	70.18	78.67	91.20	83.17	79.79	93.81	87.47	83.51	93.59	87.39
Received a service-connected nomination	26.77	19.92	24.30	49.18	31.72	42.67	38.53	23.88	33.27	36.29	19.09	26.87	30.89	21.26	27.19
Total nominations received	1.35	1.58	1.44	1.21	1.29	1.24	1.30	1.40	1.33	1.32	1.39	1.36	1.33	1.51	1.40
	(0.61)	(0.75)	(0.67)	(0.49)	(0.57)	(0.52)	(0.56)	(0.63)	(0.59)	(0.57)	(0.68)	(0.64)	(0.59)	(0.72)	(0.65)
SAT Math	654	705	672	555	657	593	607	662	638	658	733	699	641	705	665
	(80)	(69)	(80)	(94)	(87)	(104)	(86)	(73)	(91)	(100)	(66)	(91)	(89)	(73)	(89)
SAT Verbal	660	705	676	577	663	609	618	689	642	646	711	681	647	701	668
	(78)	(68)	(78)	(94)	(80)	(98)	(88)	(71)	(88)	(94)	(62)	(85)	(86)	(70)	(84)
CFA Score	367	397	378	350	376	360	349	383	361	351	378	366	362	391	373
	(84)	(77)	(83)	(90)	(81)	(88)	(90)	(77)	(87)	(84)	(72)	(83)	(86)	(78)	(84)
WPM Standardized Rank In Class score	513	640	559	411	577	473	478	636	535	507	640	580	500	636	552
	(156)	(105)	(152)	(149)	(133)	(164)	(158)	(110)	(161)	(158)	(106)	(148)	(158)	(109)	(157)
WPM Athletic score	513	606	547	486	513	496	473	536	496	452	519	489	500	576	530
	(154)	(191)	(174)	(178)	(166)	(174)	(153)	(160)	(158)	(144)	(176)	(165)	(156)	(188)	(173)
WPM Non-Athletic score	503	592	535	469	520	488	499	567	523	498	595	551	499	585	532
	(157)	(210)	(183)	(146)	(167)	(156)	(171)	(208)	(188)	(166)	(204)	(194)	(159)	(208)	(184)
WPM Combined RSO score	478	577	514	427	520	462	466	566	502	460	552	511	470	568	508
	(144)	(105)	(140)	(169)	(127)	(161)	(149)	(106)	(143)	(155)	(113)	(141)	(148)	(109)	(143)
Whole Person Multiple / 1,000	64.91	72.29	67.57	60.40	67.82	63.16	62.92	70.89	65.78	64.51	71.92	68.57	64.27	71.76	67.15
	(5.28)	(4.74)	(6.20)	(5.29)	(4.66)	(6.21)	(5.45)	(4.36)	(6.36)	(5.05)	(4.17)	(5.89)	(5.42)	(4.73)	(6.32)
Total RAB Points / 1,000	1.99	3.10	2.39	1.91	2.99	2.31	2.08	3.20	2.48	2.50	3.70	3.16	2.04	3.21	2.49
	(1.72)	(2.05)	(1.92)	(1.68)	(1.83)	(1.81)	(1.78)	(2.00)	(1.93)	(1.78)	(1.89)	(1.93)	(1.73)	(2.02)	(1.93)
Pct of high school attending 4-yr college	66.07	68.91	67.10	59.41	68.25	62.70	59.74	66.08	62.04	65.11	70.96	68.30	64.74	68.83	66.32
	(23.68)	(24.26)	(23.93)	(25.42)	(25.20)	(25.68)	(25.62)	(25.14)	(25.62)	(23.59)	(22.93)	(23.41)	(24.26)	(24.32)	(24.36)
N	5,125	2,897	8,022	488	290	778	994	557	1,551	653	791	1,444	7,576	4,728	12,304

Source: Authors' calculations from Table 3.16R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Sample restricted to non-BCA, non-prep-pool, domestic, complete applications that received a nomination and passed the fitness and medical exams. Each cell reports the sample average of the given variable. Standard deviations are listed in parentheses below means of continuous variables. Figures for SAT and WPM components are rounded to the nearest integer. For a similar table including BCA and prep pool, see Online Appendix Table A.4.

Table 6: Number and Share (%) in Each WPM-23 Decile by Race, Removing Blue Chip Athletes and Prep Pool

	Number of applicants in each decile					Share of applicants in each decile				
Decile	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Total	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Total
1	521	200	200	86	1,048	6.49	25.71	12.89	5.96	8.52
2	587	136	177	92	1,055	7.32	17.48	11.41	6.37	8.57
3	689	110	175	79	1,106	8.59	14.14	11.28	5.47	8.99
4	739	66	173	121	1,149	9.21	8.48	11.15	8.38	9.34
5	791	72	185	131	1,227	9.86	9.25	11.93	9.07	9.97
6	832	62	141	174	1,253	10.37	7.97	9.09	12.05	10.18
7	908	54	148	168	1,328	11.32	6.94	9.54	11.63	10.79
8	942	28	132	193	1,359	11.74	3.60	8.51	13.37	11.05
9	983	31	110	210	1,378	12.25	3.98	7.09	14.54	11.20
10	1,030	19	110	190	1,401	12.84	2.44	7.09	13.16	11.39
Total	8,022	778	1,551	1,444	12,304	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Table 3.19R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: The WPM is a proprietary formula that computes the weighted sum of scores on various academic and non-academic application components. Sample restricted to non-Blue-Chip, non-Prep-Pool, domestic, complete applications that received a nomination and passed the fitness and medical exams, and that have a valid WPM Score. Deciles are computed separately by Class Year, and are computed inclusive of Blue Chip Athletes and the Prep Pool. WPM-23 refers to raw WPM (i.e., net of RAB points) that is calculated using the 2023-2024 component weights for all years.

Table 7: Admission Rates (%) by WPM-23 Decile and Race, Removing Blue Chip Athletes and Prep Pool

Decile	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Total
1	3.07	4.00	3.00	4.65	3.53
2	4.60	11.76	1.69	1.09	4.93
3	9.72	32.73	10.29	21.52	12.66
4	12.86	46.97	20.23	11.57	15.75
5	20.10	59.72	29.73	38.17	25.84
6	27.64	69.35	44.68	51.72	35.83
7	33.48	75.93	63.51	59.52	42.17
8	46.60	92.86	68.94	78.24	55.04
9	65.92	90.32	83.64	86.67	71.41
10	88.54	94.74	90.91	95.79	89.94
Total	36.11	37.28	35.91	54.78	38.43

Source: Table 3.20R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Sample restricted to non-Blue-Chip, non-Prep-Pool, domestic, complete applications that received a nomination and passed the fitness and medical exams, and that have a valid WPM Score. Deciles are computed separately by Class Year. WPM-23 refers to raw WPM (i.e., net of RAB points) that is calculated using the 2023-2024 component weights for all years.

Table 8: Selected Logit Coefficients of USNA Admissions, Removing Blue Chip Athletes and Prep Pool

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Asian	0.720***	0.780***	0.955***	0.948***	1.405***	1.450***	1.218***	1.484***
	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.122)
Black	0.025	0.193**	1.981***	1.992***	2.924***	2.958***	3.077***	3.792***
	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.132)	(0.134)	(0.139)	(0.204)
Declined/Missing	-0.106	-0.064	-0.053	-0.053	0.003	0.001	-0.008	-0.160
	(0.145)	(0.148)	(0.185)	(0.187)	(0.220)	(0.222)	(0.228)	(0.348)
Hispanic	-0.020	0.099*	0.839***	0.833***	1.177***	1.195***	1.143***	1.297***
	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.122)
Native American / Hawaiian	0.210*	0.312**	0.940***	0.960***	1.186***	1.237***	1.302***	1.793***
	(0.124)	(0.126)	(0.166)	(0.167)	(0.188)	(0.190)	(0.200)	(0.273)
Female=1	0.323***	0.343***	0.359***	0.338***	0.389***	0.329***	0.182***	0.083
	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.090)
First Generation College=1		-0.517***	0.077	0.089	0.057	0.061	-0.424***	-0.806***
		(0.103)	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.158)	(0.223)
HH Income <$80,000=1		-0.354***	0.064	0.071	-0.093	-0.068	-0.275***	-0.149
		(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.087)	(0.111)
SAT Math / 100			0.831***	1.052***	1.340***	1.307***	1.333***	1.368***
			(0.045)	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.100)
SAT Verbal / 100			0.592***	0.761***	0.852***	0.827***	0.961***	1.060***
			(0.047)	(0.065)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.100)
WPM SRIC / 100			0.458***	0.452***	0.576***	0.571***	0.660***	0.716***
			(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.045)
WPM Athletic / 100			0.310***	0.300***	0.375***	0.368***	0.438***	0.504***
			(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.034)
WPM Non-Athletic / 100			0.221***	0.181***	0.228***	0.216***	0.211***	0.228***
			(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.027)
WPM Combined RSO / 100			0.412***	0.410***	0.516***	0.512***	0.554***	0.593***
			(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.036)
CFA / 100			0.338***	0.338***	0.426***	0.407***	-0.093**	-0.127**
			(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.060)
Graduation class fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Missing HH Income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Socioeconomic Measures		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
WPM components			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
WPM components × Class≥2025				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Nominations and slate competition measures					✓	✓	✓	✓
Legacy, BGO Interviews, Advanced coursework						✓	✓	✓
RAB Points							✓	✓
Observations	12,304	12,304	12,300	12,300	12,300	12,300	12,300	7,617
Pseudo R^2	0.026	0.042	0.349	0.355	0.499	0.507	0.537	0.561

Source: Table D.82R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Standard errors below each coefficient in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. There are 4 observations with missing CFA score that get dropped in Models 3 and on. Model 8 restricts to observations with no missing values for SAT scores, Household income, private high school, or percent of high school attending 4-year colleges. For models that include WPM components × Class≥2025, we only interact the WPM components whose weights changed–SAT scores, HS class rank, and extracurricular activities. We do not interact the BGO Interview or fitness measures. See Online Appendix Table A.8 for complete estimates.

Table 9: Average Marginal Effects and Admit Rates of Previous Admits

	Average Marginal Effects			Admit Rate of Previous Admits			
	Admit Rate (%) w/Racial Prefs	Admit Rate (%) w/o Racial Prefs	Average Marginal Effect (pct pt)	Avg. Admit Rate (%) w/o Racial Prefs	Harvard (w/ALDC)	UNC in-state	UNC out-of-state
Panel A: USNA, Pooled Model							
Black	37.4	12.9	24.5	32.7	30.0	57.8	8.7
Hispanic	35.9	24.5	11.4	67.3	46.1	75.8	29.2
Asian	54.8	37.6	17.2	68.7			
Native American / Hawaiian	41.4	28.8	12.7	70.0			
Panel B: USNA, 2023–24 Model							
Black	31.9	13.3	18.6	38.3			
Hispanic	28.9	21.5	7.4	73.4			
Asian	53.4	35.9	17.6	67.2			
Native American / Hawaiian	38.8	26.6	12.2	69.1			
Panel C: USNA, 2025–27 Model							
Black	42.0	12.6	29.4	29.4			
Hispanic	42.3	27.1	15.2	63.3			
Asian	55.6	38.9	16.7	70.0			
Native American / Hawaiian	43.7	30.7	13.1	70.3			

Source: Tables 4.3R and 4.4R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: This table combines the analysis of average marginal effects of race and admit rates for previous admits using our preferred USNA admissions models. Panel A uses Model 6 from the pooled USNA models (see Online Appendix Table A.8); Panels B and C each use Model 5 from the cohort USNA models (see Online Appendix Tables A.9–A.10). The admission probabilities in column 1 mechanically matches the raw admit rates for the given subsample. The "Admit Rate of Previous Admits" columns use Bayes' rule to compute the average admit rate of applicants who were admitted under a racial preferences regime.

The final two columns report comparable estimates from Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom (2023) analyzing Harvard and UNC admissions. "ADLC" refers to Harvard applicants who are recruited athletes, on the Dean's interest list, legacies, or children of faculty.

Table 10: Counterfactual Racial Shares (%) without Racial Preferences, Full Analysis Sample

		Race/Ethnicity			
	Scenario	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White
(1)	Data	14.28	10.53	12.50	58.73
(2)	Model (Status Quo)	14.28	10.54	12.49	58.72
(3)	No Racial Prefs	12.02	8.14	10.99	65.03
(4)	No Racial or BCA Prefs	12.47	7.44	11.48	64.57
(5)	No Racial or Olympic BCA Prefs	12.28	8.07	11.32	64.35
(6)	No Racial or Prep Pool Prefs	12.16	6.07	9.72	68.30
(7)	No Racial, Prep Pool or BCA Prefs	13.08	3.78	10.56	68.71
(8)	No Racial, Prep Pool or Olympic BCA Prefs	12.57	5.92	10.19	67.41
(9)	Racial but no BCA Prefs	14.81	10.37	13.13	57.53
(10)	Racial but no Olympic BCA Prefs	14.64	10.76	12.97	57.50
(11)	Racial but no Prep Pool Prefs	14.41	9.28	11.37	61.02
(12)	Racial but no Prep Pool or BCA Prefs	15.29	7.95	12.32	60.44
(13)	Racial but no Prep Pool or Olympic BCA Prefs	14.87	9.54	11.97	59.54

Source: Authors' calculations based on Online Appendix Tables A.16 and A.17.

Notes: This table shows the results of the capacity constraints counterfactual analysis for the entire Classes of 2023–27. In the Status Quo and No Racial Prefs scenarios, we treat Prep Pool and BCA admissions outcomes as fixed. When removing Racial and BCA preferences, we treat Prep Pool admissions outcomes as fixed. When removing Racial and Prep Pool preferences, we treat BCA admissions outcomes as fixed. BCA stands for Blue Chip Athlete; Olympic BCA refers to all sports except for basketball and football; and Prep Pool refers to NAPS, Foundation Prep, or Civilian Prep.

Table 11: Shares (%) of Candidates Above and Below Initial QA Cutoffs and QA Rate Below Initial Cutoff by Race

Race/Ethnicity	Share Above Initial Threshold	Share Below Initial Threshold	Share of QA Admits Above Initial Threshold	Share of QA Admits Below Initial Threshold	QA Rate Below Threshold
White	72.01	74.13	72.05	54.93	29.73
Black	2.39	2.63	2.41	5.67	86.36
Hispanic	8.37	5.99	8.19	9.55	64.00
Asian	13.88	13.89	13.98	26.57	76.72
Native American / Hawaiian	1.67	1.68	1.69	2.39	57.14
Declined / Missing	1.67	1.68	1.69	0.90	21.43
Total	418	835	415	335	40.12

Source: Table A.3 of Trial Exhibit P518.

Notes: Sample restricted to applicants who were eligible to be a Qualified Alternate, had a Most Recent Board Result of Early Notify, Qualified, or Qualified Prep Pool, and who were not admitted through another channel. The row labeled Total lists the total observation counts and the average rate of being admitted as a Qualified Alternate while having a WPM score below the initial threshold. Applicants must be above the final QA threshold to be included in the sample.

Figure 1: Diagram of Nested Logit Nesting Structure



Notes: This diagram depicts the nesting structure for the decision over which channel to admit applicants based on their WPM score and nomination status. Declined offers are coded as 'Admitted' but excluded from channel choice models since channel is only observed for matriculants.

Figure 2: Qualified Alternate Admission Rates by WPM Bin and Minority Status



Source: Figure 3.1F of Trial Exhibit P518.

Notes: Data are limited to applicants of known race who were eligible for QA (i.e. had a complete application, deemed qualified by the board, qualified both medically and physically, had a congressional nomination, and were not missing WPMs) with WPMs between the initial QA cutoff and 5000 points below the final QA cutoff. A small number of applicants with WPMs above the final QA cutoff who are admitted as Additional Appointees are also removed.

Table 12: Average Marginal Effects and Admit Rate for Previous Admits: NAPS Admissions

	Average Marginal Effects			Admit Rate of Previous Admits
	Admit Rate (%) w/Racial Prefs	Admit Rate (%) w/o Racial Prefs	Average Marginal Effect (pct pt)	Avg. Admit Rate (%) w/o Racial Prefs
Panel A: NAPS, Classes of 2023–2024				
Black	33.2	9.1	24.1	23.6
Hispanic	15.3	9.3	6.1	57.9
Asian	8.0	4.9	3.1	60.6
Native American / Hawaiian	13.8	6.6	7.2	47.8
Panel B: NAPS, Classes of 2025–26				
Black	70.7	18.4	52.3	24.5
Hispanic	33.1	14.8	18.3	44.8
Asian	19.3	9.6	9.7	50.0
Native American / Hawaiian	34.7	13.5	21.2	34.9

Source: Tables 4.9R and 4.10R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: This table combines the analysis of average marginal effects of race and admit rates for previous admits using our preferred NAPS admissions models (Model 5 in Online Appendix Table A.15). The admission probabilities in column 1 mechanically matches the raw admit rates for the given subsample. The "Admit Rate of Previous Admits" columns use Bayes' rule to compute the average admit rate of applicants who were admitted under a racial preferences regime.

Online Appendix

List of Tables

A Supporting Figures and Tables

Online Appendix Table A.1: Sample Selection Criteria for USNA and NAPS

	Obs. Removed		Obs. remaining	
Selection criterion	Applicants	Admits	Applicants	Admits
Panel A: USNA Applicant Pool				
Beginning sample			70,508	7,009
Remove non-US citizens	927	88	69,581	6,921
Remove those nominated by foreign delegates	11	1	69,570	6,920
Remove those who withdraw or have incomplete apps.	44,129	0	25,441	6,920
Remove those without a nomination	4,810	6	20,631	6,914
Remove those who did not qualify medically or physically	6,024	0	14,607	6,914
Remove those with missing WPM components	62	8	14,545	6,906
Remove Blue Chip Athletes	1,268	1,267	13,277	5,639
Remove Prep Pool (NAPS, Foundation, CivPrep)	973	911	12,304	4,728
Panel B: NAPS Applicant Pool				
Beginning sample			70,508	1,379
Remove non-US citizens	927	0	69,581	1,379
Remove those nominated by foreign delegates	11	0	69,570	1,379
Remove those who withdraw or have incomplete apps.	44,129	0	25,441	1,379
Remove those who did not qualify medically or physically	8,654	0	16,787	1,379
Remove those who were admitted to USNA	6,914	0	9,873	1,379
Remove those who were admitted to Foundation or Civ Prep	271	0	9,602	1,379
Remove those applying from Prep Pool	63	0	9,539	1,379
Remove those who did not report gender	18	0	9,521	1,379

Source: This table is a combination of Tables C.1R and C.2R in Trial Exhibit P222.

Online Appendix Table A.2: Frequencies, Shares (%) and Average WPM of Admits by Admission Channel and Applicant Pool

	Non-BCA, Non-Prep	BCA, Non-Prep	Non-BCA, Prep	BCA Prep	Total
Panel A: Frequencies					
Congressional	2,532	135	193	26	2,886
Qualified Alternate	655	74	20	1	750
Service-connected	243	97	321	208	869
Additional Appointee	297	560	364	111	1,332
Declined Admission	1,001	48	13	7	1,069
Total	4,728	914	911	353	6,906
Panel B: Row Percentages					
Congressional	87.7	4.7	6.7	0.9	100.0
Qualified Alternate	87.3	9.9	2.7	0.1	100.0
Service-connected	28.0	11.2	36.9	23.9	100.0
Additional Appointee	22.3	42.0	27.3	8.3	100.0
Declined Admission	93.6	4.5	1.2	0.7	100.0
Total	68.5	13.2	13.2	5.1	100.0
Panel C: Column Percentages					
Congressional	53.6	14.8	21.2	7.4	41.8
Qualified Alternate	13.9	8.1	2.2	0.3	10.9
Service-connected	5.1	10.6	35.2	58.9	12.6
Additional Appointee	6.3	61.3	40.0	31.4	19.3
Declined Admission	21.2	5.3	1.4	2.0	15.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Panel D: Average WPM net of RAB Points					
Congressional	68,011	65,494	62,578	59,598	67,454
Qualified Alternate	71,685	69,879	70,618	72,393	71,480
Service-connected	65,976	61,651	59,854	56,905	61,061
Additional Appointee	64,710	61,637	61,279	57,094	61,846
Declined Admission	69,647	64,148	62,081	57,788	69,230
Total	68,554	63,007	61,269	57,224	66,280

Source: Table D.13R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Sample includes only USNA admits. BCA refers to Blue Chip Athlete; Prep refers to NAPS, Foundation, or Civilian Prep.

Online Appendix Table A.3: Application Summary Statistics by Race, Segmented by Completion Status

	White			Black			Hispanic			Asian			Total		
Variable	Incomp	Complete	Total	Incomp	Complete	Total	Incomp	Complete	Total	Incomp	Complete	Total	Incomp	Complete	Total
Admitted to USNA	0.00	25.20	9.86	0.00	31.68	9.41	0.00	26.53	8.66	0.00	36.39	12.92	0.00	27.18	9.94
Female	29.05	24.75	27.37	37.02	26.18	33.80	33.90	28.70	32.20	30.64	28.91	30.03	30.96	25.75	29.05
First generation college	1.59	3.33	2.27	4.81	8.45	5.89	6.31	11.73	8.08	2.92	7.00	4.37	2.91	5.39	3.81
First generation American	2.76	2.77	2.77	15.58	13.53	14.34	26.57	21.89	23.63	45.30	47.08	46.51	13.28	11.20	11.85
Legacy (USNA)	0.61	4.26	2.04	0.15	2.48	0.84	0.45	2.82	1.22	0.20	2.80	1.12	0.49	3.76	1.69
Legacy (Non-USNA Service Academy)	0.58	3.08	1.56	0.22	1.18	0.50	0.19	2.02	0.79	0.36	1.25	0.68	0.46	2.55	1.22
Blue Chip Athlete	0.16	5.15	2.11	0.15	10.50	3.22	0.04	2.73	0.92	0.14	1.17	0.52	0.13	5.04	1.93
Applying from NAPS	0.18	2.49	1.08	1.12	15.25	5.32	0.24	6.19	2.18	0.04	3.24	1.18	0.29	4.31	1.76
Applying from Foundation or CivPrep	0.06	0.76	0.33	0.00	1.00	0.30	0.09	1.59	0.58	0.04	1.18	0.44	0.05	0.97	0.39
Attended private high school	19.01	22.50	20.40	12.48	20.12	14.74	15.79	19.65	17.08	11.74	15.30	13.00	16.91	21.22	18.51
BGO interview overall rating: Top 5 pct	0.71	15.29	6.41	0.35	8.37	2.73	0.49	12.44	4.39	0.65	14.48	5.56	0.62	14.07	5.54
Family Income over $0,000	13.45	74.79	37.45	6.81	46.10	18.49	9.07	57.75	24.96	10.60	62.95	29.18	11.47	67.89	32.10
Received a Nomination	6.14	82.16	35.88	5.40	70.41	24.71	6.38	82.78	31.32	5.43	81.44	32.41	6.06	81.09	33.50
Missing SAT scores (coded in database as 200)	0.09	1.65	0.70	0.15	3.05	1.01	0.09	2.57	0.90	0.00	2.25	0.80	0.08	1.98	0.78
SAT Math	612.90	681.37	631.59	524.09	588.11	537.14	568.30	609.64	580.14	654.34	676.00	664.01	600.70	639.19	615.64
	(94.81)	(96.68)	(97.63)	(106.59)	(105.59)	(107.26)	(103.54)	(108.51)	(107.67)	(104.53)	(110.85)	(107.89)	(105.11)	(105.91)	(107.20)
SAT Verbal	618.89	655.62	636.74	539.85	569.52	552.33	579.23	617.08	595.56	638.82	659.83	648.20	606.12	642.66	623.15
	(93.70)	(94.85)	(96.08)	(108.89)	(106.01)	(108.67)	(102.59)	(106.05)	(105.71)	(96.30)	(102.58)	(99.70)	(101.37)	(102.11)	(103.34)
CPA Score	331.83	364.31	359.74	300.85	351.74	339.02	298.40	346.54	336.53	307.34	350.38	343.11	318.49	359.29	352.55
	(105.63)	(90.10)	(93.13)	(113.91)	(96.68)	(103.61)	(108.46)	(95.45)	(100.20)	(106.51)	(90.38)	(94.67)	(108.60)	(91.81)	(95.99)
WPM Standardized Rank In Class score	486.44	530.10	524.15	413.62	429.23	426.39	477.12	502.21	498.28	516.92	552.62	547.13	480.68	519.24	513.61
	(164.96)	(159.96)	(161.34)	(163.89)	(163.56)	(163.70)	(166.58)	(166.67)	(166.64)	(167.50)	(157.76)	(159.79)	(167.14)	(163.81)	(164.86)
WPM Athletic score	494.16	528.99	523.73	480.32	505.33	500.19	450.40	481.50	478.66	452.04	472.97	469.64	481.53	514.72	509.39
	(171.11)	(169.49)	(170.19)	(180.83)	(175.31)	(176.71)	(149.70)	(163.90)	(162.05)	(139.96)	(156.30)	(153.98)	(166.98)	(169.41)	(169.46)
WPM Non-Athletic score	475.22	504.19	499.81	460.97	456.16	457.15	475.65	493.45	490.40	489.58	520.73	515.77	474.97	500.27	496.21
	(157.70)	(167.78)	(166.61)	(164.53)	(143.95)	(148.39)	(160.09)	(171.18)	(169.44)	(169.64)	(184.43)	(182.49)	(160.63)	(169.07)	(167.99)
WPM Combined RSO score	477.85	489.75	488.18	431.01	424.76	425.95	464.25	474.11	472.62	470.68	483.34	481.47	468.98	480.61	478.95
	(155.27)	(147.29)	(148.43)	(182.10)	(175.08)	(176.42)	(155.60)	(152.66)	(153.12)	(148.80)	(147.76)	(147.95)	(158.74)	(152.07)	(153.09)
Whole Person Multiple / 1,000	53.99	65.50	63.81	53.52	60.47	59.24	53.25	63.59	61.92	56.16	66.37	64.86	54.09	64.86	63.22
	(13.10)	(6.69)	(8.94)	(10.69)	(6.62)	(7.96)	(12.72)	(6.72)	(8.85)	(12.77)	(6.53)	(8.85)	(12.75)	(6.86)	(8.92)
Total RAB Points / 1,000	0.14	2.02	0.88	0.09	1.74	0.58	0.09	2.04	0.73	0.14	2.68	1.04	0.12	2.07	0.83
	(0.62)	(1.83)	(1.55)	(0.58)	(1.74)	(1.31)	(0.61)	(1.90)	(1.50)	(0.69)	(2.02)	(1.80)	(0.62)	(1.87)	(1.55)
Pct of high school attending 4-yr college	66.08	67.38	67.23	59.09	63.23	62.53	58.99	62.13	61.71	66.01	68.07	67.81	63.98	66.38	66.08
	(24.12)	(24.05)	(24.06)	(25.92)	(25.57)	(25.67)	(25.56)	(25.39)	(25.43)	(25.16)	(23.24)	(23.49)	(24.93)	(24.41)	(24.48)
Missing WPM Component(s)	93.75	3.46	58.42	93.96	7.49	68.27	94.83	5.51	65.68	93.94	3.65	61.90	93.98	4.23	61.16
Missing Test Score(s)	32.23	0.35	19.76	42.73	1.61	30.51	36.77	0.95	25.08	32.04	0.29	20.77	34.31	0.58	21.98
Missing Parent(s) Income or First Gen College Status	81.32	10.53	53.63	81.09	16.64	61.94	79.77	11.61	57.52	82.25	11.34	57.08	81.25	11.92	55.89
Missing CFA Status	89.93	4.33	56.44	86.94	7.45	63.33	88.06	6.13	61.32	89.18	3.83	58.89	89.15	4.86	58.33
Missing NCHS PctAge	20.77	18.59	19.92	28.31	28.76	28.44	24.90	22.52	24.12	17.49	17.42	17.46	22.24	20.16	21.48
Incomplete/Withdrawn App	100.00	0.00	60.88	100.00	0.00	70.29	100.00	0.00	67.36	100.00	0.00	64.51	100.00	0.00	63.43
N	25,064	16,107	41,171	5,430	2,295	7,725	6,736	3,264	10,000	4,935	2,715	7,650	44,129	25,441	69,570

Source: Table D.1R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Sample restricted to domestic applications. Each cell reports the sample average of the given variable. Standard deviations are listed in parentheses below means of continuous variables.

Online Appendix Table A.4: Application Summary Statistics by Race

	White			Black			Hispanic			Asian			Total		
Variable	Rejected	Admitted	Total	Rejected	Admitted	Total	Rejected	Admitted	Total	Rejected	Admitted	Total	Rejected	Admitted	Total
Admitted	0.00	100.00	44.06	0.00	100.00	58.82	0.00	100.00	46.27	0.00	100.00	60.05	0.00	100.00	47.48
Female	21.83	30.13	25.49	26.92	25.03	25.81	27.94	30.13	28.95	28.05	33.27	31.18	23.59	29.97	26.62
First generation college	3.61	2.05	2.92	9.43	6.74	7.85	12.67	7.53	10.29	8.84	5.98	7.13	5.83	3.84	4.88
First generation American	2.66	2.56	2.62	15.35	13.62	14.33	21.86	19.00	20.54	47.26	48.68	48.11	10.09	12.63	11.29
Legacy (USNA)	4.14	6.61	5.23	2.36	4.13	3.40	3.19	4.40	3.75	3.05	3.35	3.23	3.84	5.55	4.65
Legacy (Non-USNA Service Academy)	3.96	3.16	3.61	1.57	1.51	1.54	2.30	2.32	2.31	1.37	1.62	1.52	3.35	2.59	2.99
Blue Chip Athlete	0.02	20.24	8.93	0.00	32.87	19.34	0.00	9.97	4.61	0.00	8.52	5.12	0.01	18.35	8.72
Applying from NAPS	0.39	9.27	4.30	4.13	44.43	27.83	0.70	22.60	10.83	0.46	8.62	5.36	0.75	14.90	7.47
Applying from Foundation or CivPrep	0.06	2.86	1.29	0.00	3.16	1.86	0.10	5.68	2.68	0.00	3.25	1.95	0.07	3.40	1.65
Attended private high school	21.70	26.22	23.71	16.51	23.83	21.21	18.96	19.69	19.31	14.95	16.97	16.22	20.65	23.96	22.27
BGO interviewer overall rating: Top 5 pct	14.76	25.84	19.64	11.00	14.58	13.11	12.08	20.97	16.19	11.28	24.24	19.06	13.69	23.70	18.45
Family Income over 80,000	75.22	77.29	76.13	48.13	49.52	48.95	57.29	60.72	58.87	60.06	66.02	63.64	68.90	69.84	69.34
Missing SAT scores (coded in database as 200)	0.58	0.42	0.51	2.36	0.96	1.54	0.80	0.81	0.80	1.68	0.41	0.91	0.82	0.56	0.70
Received a congressional nomination	86.68	91.00	88.58	61.49	64.92	63.51	78.54	85.17	81.61	79.88	90.16	86.05	83.14	87.10	85.02
Received a service-connected nomination	27.05	26.53	26.82	51.28	59.83	56.31	38.92	40.44	39.62	36.59	26.57	30.57	31.39	32.31	31.83
Total nominations received	1.35	1.54	1.43	1.21	1.40	1.32	1.30	1.49	1.39	1.33	1.42	1.38	1.33	1.50	1.41
	(0.61)	(0.74)	(0.67)	(0.48)	(0.63)	(0.58)	(0.56)	(0.67)	(0.62)	(0.57)	(0.69)	(0.65)	(0.59)	(0.71)	(0.66)
SAT Math	653.33	684.19	666.93	553.60	601.97	582.05	607.12	657.66	630.50	658.23	714.65	692.11	640.17	675.82	657.10
	(80.59)	(77.51)	(80.71)	(92.72)	(86.72)	(92.33)	(85.93)	(88.03)	(90.47)	(99.86)	(80.19)	(92.76)	(88.85)	(86.34)	(89.46)
SAT Verbal	659.66	683.94	670.36	575.17	608.86	594.98	617.35	655.69	635.09	645.69	694.24	674.84	646.57	673.27	659.25
	(78.76)	(76.74)	(78.80)	(93.07)	(86.54)	(90.78)	(87.57)	(84.08)	(88.05)	(94.36)	(74.60)	(86.37)	(85.98)	(83.06)	(85.64)
CFA Score	366.92	394.73	379.17	350.54	371.62	362.93	348.52	377.21	361.79	350.48	375.02	365.22	361.93	387.13	373.90
	(84.31)	(77.40)	(82.50)	(90.15)	(87.74)	(89.31)	(90.15)	(82.03)	(87.65)	(83.83)	(79.87)	(82.33)	(85.89)	(80.15)	(84.16)
WPM Standardized Rank In Class score	512.53	594.35	548.58	407.78	486.84	454.28	478.22	590.23	530.05	507.66	613.58	571.26	499.50	584.46	539.84
	(155.82)	(145.11)	(156.55)	(148.96)	(164.84)	(163.14)	(158.01)	(143.77)	(161.53)	(158.51)	(130.24)	(151.34)	(158.10)	(149.67)	(159.88)
WPM Athletic score	513.62	594.15	549.10	490.58	542.77	521.28	473.40	526.94	498.17	451.95	512.56	488.35	500.86	568.30	532.88
	(153.76)	(157.48)	(174.09)	(181.28)	(172.05)	(177.71)	(152.34)	(170.14)	(162.98)	(143.41)	(173.97)	(165.10)	(156.13)	(185.36)	(173.92)
WPM Non-Athletic score	502.67	553.43	525.03	466.14	482.17	475.56	498.77	540.59	518.12	497.99	571.71	542.26	498.94	547.79	522.13
	(157.07)	(201.82)	(179.94)	(144.42)	(163.87)	(156.29)	(171.14)	(204.56)	(188.46)	(165.70)	(206.76)	(194.74)	(159.06)	(201.25)	(181.96)
WPM Combined RSO score	476.97	546.93	507.80	423.20	473.35	452.70	466.02	537.46	499.08	461.02	537.06	506.68	469.68	536.03	501.18
	(144.38)	(127.84)	(141.65)	(171.20)	(151.18)	(161.56)	(149.68)	(124.60)	(143.11)	(155.19)	(126.51)	(143.55)	(149.12)	(132.01)	(145.09)
Whole Person Multiple / 1,000	64.88	69.98	67.13	60.27	63.87	62.39	62.91	68.44	65.47	64.52	70.49	68.11	64.23	69.18	66.58
	(5.30)	(6.21)	(6.25)	(5.32)	(6.09)	(6.05)	(5.45)	(5.69)	(6.21)	(5.06)	(5.25)	(5.94)	(5.44)	(6.31)	(6.37)
Total RAB Points / 1,000	1.99	2.85	2.37	1.92	2.40	2.20	2.08	2.90	2.46	2.51	3.54	3.13	2.04	2.91	2.45
	(1.72)	(1.93)	(1.87)	(1.66)	(1.69)	(1.69)	(1.77)	(1.94)	(1.90)	(1.78)	(1.87)	(1.90)	(1.73)	(1.93)	(1.87)
Pct of high school attending 4-yr college	66.04	70.08	67.77	59.57	67.94	64.01	59.76	64.95	62.01	65.02	70.92	68.47	64.71	69.30	66.86
	(23.70)	(24.13)	(23.97)	(25.37)	(25.26)	(25.64)	(25.64)	(25.10)	(25.53)	(23.62)	(22.99)	(23.43)	(24.27)	(24.34)	(24.41)
N	5,149	4,056	9,205	509	727	1,236	1,002	863	1,865	656	986	1,642	7,639	6,906	14,545

Source: Table 3.14R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Sample restricted to domestic, complete applications that received a nomination and passed the fitness and medical exams. Each cell reports the sample average of the given variable. Standard deviations are listed in parentheses below means of continuous variables.

Online Appendix Table A.5: Number and Share (%) in Each WPM-23 Decile by Race

	Number of applicants in each decile					Share of applicants in each decile				
Decile	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Total	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Total
1	693	346	251	109	1,458	7.53	27.99	13.46	6.64	10.02
2	772	246	230	127	1,454	8.39	19.90	12.33	7.73	10.00
3	866	189	230	105	1,454	9.41	15.29	12.33	6.39	10.00
4	904	116	214	154	1,455	9.82	9.39	11.47	9.38	10.00
5	920	102	220	150	1,453	9.99	8.25	11.80	9.14	9.99
6	957	81	177	194	1,456	10.40	6.55	9.49	11.81	10.01
7	981	66	169	183	1,454	10.66	5.34	9.06	11.14	10.00
8	1,015	33	138	203	1,455	11.03	2.67	7.40	12.36	10.00
9	1,030	35	121	221	1,453	11.19	2.83	6.49	13.46	9.99
10	1,067	22	115	196	1,453	11.59	1.78	6.17	11.94	9.99
Total	9,205	1,236	1,865	1,642	14,545	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Table 3.17R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Sample restricted to domestic, complete applications that received a nomination and passed the fitness and medical exams, and that have a valid WPM Score. Deciles are computed separately by Class Year. WPM-23 refers to raw WPM (i.e., net of RAB points) that is calculated using the 2023-2024 component weights for all years.

Online Appendix Table A.6: Admission Rates (%) by WPM-23 Decile and Race

Decile	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Total
1	25.40	40.17	21.51	24.77	28.46
2	26.94	50.41	23.91	27.56	30.47
3	27.94	60.32	31.30	40.95	33.22
4	28.65	68.10	35.51	30.52	33.06
5	30.87	70.59	40.91	46.00	36.96
6	37.10	76.54	54.80	56.19	44.57
7	38.43	80.30	67.46	62.30	47.04
8	50.34	93.94	70.29	79.31	57.94
9	67.48	91.43	85.12	87.33	72.88
10	88.94	95.45	91.30	95.92	90.30
Total	44.06	58.82	46.27	60.05	47.48

Source: Table 3.18R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Sample restricted to domestic, complete applications that received a nomination and passed the fitness and medical exams, and that have a valid WPM Score. Deciles are computed separately by Class Year. WPM-23 refers to raw WPM (i.e., net of RAB points) that is calculated using the 2023-2024 component weights for all years.

Online Appendix Table A.7: Frequencies, Shares (%) and Average WPM of Enrollees by Admission Channel and Race

	Asian	Black	Declined	Hispanic	Other	White	Total
Panel A: Frequencies							
Congressional	386	123	37	337	74	1,929	2,886
Qualified Alternate	147	29	10	66	15	483	750
Service-connected	90	252	14	130	32	351	869
Additional Appointee	174	251	9	212	34	652	1,332
Total	797	655	70	745	155	3,415	5,837
Panel B: Row Percentages							
Congressional	13.4	4.3	1.3	11.7	2.6	66.8	100.0
Qualified Alternate	19.6	3.9	1.3	8.8	2.0	64.4	100.0
Service-connected	10.4	29.0	1.6	15.0	3.7	40.4	100.0
Additional Appointee	13.1	18.8	0.7	15.9	2.6	48.9	100.0
Total	13.7	11.2	1.2	12.8	2.7	58.5	100.0
Panel C: Column Percentages							
Congressional	48.4	18.8	52.9	45.2	47.7	56.5	49.4
Qualified Alternate	18.4	4.4	14.3	8.9	9.7	14.1	12.8
Service-connected	11.3	38.5	20.0	17.4	20.6	10.3	14.9
Additional Appointee	21.8	38.3	12.9	28.5	21.9	19.1	22.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Panel D: Average WPM net of RAB Points							
Congressional	67,332	63,756	68,107	66,567	67,243	67,865	67,454
Qualified Alternate	70,244	69,613	71,976	71,080	71,199	72,021	71,480
Service-connected	63,137	58,940	62,868	61,996	60,023	61,727	61,061
Additional Appointee	63,346	60,894	63,545	62,433	61,487	61,616	61,846
Total	66,525	61,066	67,025	64,993	64,873	66,629	65,740

Source: Table D.14R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Sample includes only USNA enrollees. Other race includes Native American and Hawaiian.

Online Appendix Table A.8: Complete Logit Estimates of USNA Admissions, Pooled Model, Removing Blue Chip Athletes and Prep Pool

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Asian	0.720***	0.780***	0.955***	0.948***	1.405***	1.450***	1.218***	1.484***
	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.122)
Black	0.025	0.193**	1.981***	1.992***	2.924***	2.958***	3.077***	3.792***
	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.132)	(0.134)	(0.139)	(0.204)
Declined/Missing	-0.106	-0.064	-0.053	-0.053	0.003	0.001	-0.008	-0.160
	(0.145)	(0.148)	(0.185)	(0.187)	(0.220)	(0.222)	(0.228)	(0.348)
Hispanic	-0.020	0.099*	0.839***	0.833***	1.177***	1.195***	1.143***	1.297***
	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.122)
Native American / Hawaiian	0.210*	0.312**	0.940***	0.960***	1.186***	1.237***	1.302***	1.793***
	(0.124)	(0.126)	(0.166)	(0.167)	(0.188)	(0.190)	(0.200)	(0.273)
Female=1	0.323***	0.343***	0.359***	0.338***	0.389***	0.329***	0.182***	0.083
	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.090)
Graduating Class=2024	0.195***	0.193***	0.301***	0.317***	0.364***	0.368***	0.366***	0.335***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.109)
Graduating Class=2025	0.651***	0.764***	1.040***	5.085***	6.386***	6.441***	7.102***	8.835***
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.085)	(0.706)	(0.820)	(0.829)	(0.862)	(1.134)
Graduating Class=2026	0.641***	0.780***	1.336***	5.329***	6.654***	6.728***	7.526***	9.411***
	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.084)	(0.701)	(0.816)	(0.825)	(0.858)	(1.130)
Graduating Class=2027	0.257***	0.334***	0.823***	4.810***	6.165***	6.224***	6.860***	8.555***
	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.081)	(0.703)	(0.817)	(0.827)	(0.859)	(1.127)
First Generation College=1		-0.517***	0.077	0.089	0.057	0.061	-0.424***	-0.806***
		(0.103)	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.158)	(0.223)
HH Income <80,000=1		-0.354***	0.064	0.071	-0.093	-0.068	-0.275***	-0.149
		(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.087)	(0.111)
Missing HH Income=1		-0.242***	-0.083	-0.083	-0.068	-0.079	-0.151	
		(0.067)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.104)	
Pct of HS attending 4yr College / 100		0.565***	0.662***	0.652***	1.174***	1.195***	-0.160	-0.379

Continued on next page

Online Appendix Table A.8 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
		(0.097)	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.152)	(0.168)	(0.240)
Private HS		0.105	0.491***	0.475***	0.309***	0.305***	0.156	0.185
		(0.069)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.122)
Pct FRPL		0.319***	0.461***	0.504***	0.139	0.169	-0.068	-0.402*
		(0.122)	(0.155)	(0.156)	(0.182)	(0.184)	(0.190)	(0.217)
Avg IRS Zip Code Salary / 100,000		0.032	-0.006	-0.013	0.019	0.032	-0.012	-0.030
		(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.065)
Missing Pct of HS attending 4yr College=1		-0.338***	-0.205	-0.173	-0.117	-0.107	0.074	
		(0.127)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.201)	
Missing Private HS status=1		-0.163	-0.038	-0.060	-0.386**	-0.361**	-0.361**	
		(0.113)	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.167)	(0.169)	(0.176)	
Missing HS Pct FRPL=1		0.008	0.054	0.065	0.037	0.056	0.015	
		(0.067)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.102)	
Missing Avg IRS Zip Code Salary=1		-0.286***	-0.071	-0.091	-0.053	-0.082	-0.095	
		(0.105)	(0.130)	(0.133)	(0.154)	(0.155)	(0.162)	
SAT Math / 100			0.831***	1.052***	1.340***	1.307***	1.333***	1.368***
			(0.045)	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.100)
SAT Verbal / 100			0.592***	0.761***	0.852***	0.827***	0.961***	1.060***
			(0.047)	(0.065)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.100)
WPM SRIC / 100			0.458***	0.452***	0.576***	0.571***	0.660***	0.716***
			(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.045)
WPM Athletic / 100			0.310***	0.300***	0.375***	0.368***	0.438***	0.504***
			(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.034)
WPM Non-Athletic / 100			0.221***	0.181***	0.228***	0.216***	0.211***	0.228***
			(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.027)
WPM Combined RSO / 100			0.412***	0.410***	0.516***	0.512***	0.554***	0.593***
			(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.036)
CFA / 100			0.338***	0.338***	0.426***	0.407***	-0.093**	-0.127**
			(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.060)

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Online Appendix Table A.8 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Missing SAT			5.907***	4.329***	4.836***	4.633***	5.040***	
			(0.365)	(0.411)	(0.478)	(0.483)	(0.499)	
1[Class $\geq$ 2025] = 1$\times$ SAT Math / 100				-0.369***	-0.499***	-0.494***	-0.514***	-0.654***
				(0.086)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.138)
1[Class $\geq$ 2025] = 1$\times$ SAT Verbal / 100				-0.349***	-0.447***	-0.465***	-0.534***	-0.671***
				(0.093)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.150)
1[Class $\geq$ 2025] = 1$\times$ WPM SRIC / 100				0.033	0.021	0.027	-0.004	-0.018
				(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.066)
1[Class $\geq$ 2025] = 1$\times$ WPM Athletic / 100				0.026	0.058*	0.059*	0.048	0.065
				(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.046)
1[Class $\geq$ 2025] = 1$\times$ WPM Non-Athletic / 100				0.115***	0.158***	0.152***	0.185***	0.223***
				(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.045)
1+ Congressional Noms=1					0.229	0.258	0.285*	0.367*
					(0.164)	(0.167)	(0.172)	(0.220)
2+ Congressional Noms=1					0.310**	0.352***	0.469***	0.570***
					(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.127)	(0.165)
SECNAV (Regular) Nom=1					1.090***	0.735***	1.494***	2.064***
					(0.263)	(0.270)	(0.282)	(0.466)
CDV / Medal of Honor Nom=1					1.019***	1.064***	1.224***	1.269***
					(0.198)	(0.200)	(0.207)	(0.281)
Applying from Nuclear Power School=1					2.947***	2.918***	3.017***	2.650***
					(0.347)	(0.346)	(0.356)	(0.650)
Nom on 1+ Type 1 slates					9.107***	9.484***	11.181***	13.670***
					(0.877)	(0.886)	(0.922)	(1.231)
Nom on 1+ Type 2 slates					3.773***	3.828***	4.457***	3.631***
					(0.866)	(0.878)	(0.837)	(1.082)
Nom on Principal slate (not principal)					-0.223*	-0.226*	-0.183	-0.250
					(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.174)
Principal on 1+ slates					4.379***	4.421***	4.737***	5.379***

Continued on next page

Online Appendix Table A.8 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
					(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.143)	(0.202)
Within 4000 WPM points on Type 1 slate					0.147*	0.118	-0.004	-0.078
					(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.109)
Within 4000 WPM points on Type 2 slate					0.524***	0.509***	0.256	0.137
					(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.170)	(0.211)
Max WPM on slate & 4000+ above all others					1.394***	1.364***	0.826***	1.382***
					(0.197)	(0.200)	(0.207)	(0.327)
log (no. Type 1 competitors + 1)					-0.638***	-0.665***	-0.857***	-0.951***
					(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.105)	(0.142)
log (no. Type 2 competitors + 1)					-1.305***	-1.341***	-1.527***	-1.538***
					(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.146)	(0.184)
min of Avg (WPM / 10,000) on Type 1 slates					-1.135***	-1.183***	-1.365***	-1.706***
					(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.132)	(0.174)
min of Avg (WPM / 10,000) on Type 2 slates					-0.073	-0.067	-0.078	0.068
					(0.134)	(0.136)	(0.131)	(0.168)
TotalNominations=2					0.076	0.015	-0.078	-0.058
					(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.123)
TotalNominations=3					0.436***	0.309**	0.154	0.084
					(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.159)	(0.207)
TotalNominations=4					0.781**	0.654**	0.165	0.244
					(0.303)	(0.314)	(0.326)	(0.449)
TotalNominations=5					2.955**	2.549**	2.308	
					(1.352)	(1.290)	(1.540)	
Legacy (USNA)=1						0.508***	0.341**	0.254
						(0.133)	(0.138)	(0.170)
Legacy (non-USNA Svc Academy)=1						-0.342**	-0.452***	-0.380*
						(0.155)	(0.163)	(0.210)
RAB for AP, IB, or Honors courses						0.179***	-0.009	0.024
						(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.082)

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Online Appendix Table A.8 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
BGO Top 25 pct						-0.397***	-0.155**	-0.254***
						(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.095)
BGO Above Average						-0.614***	-0.288***	-0.396***
						(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.139)
BGO Average						-0.838***	-0.539***	-0.731***
						(0.145)	(0.152)	(0.198)
BGO Below Average						-1.858***	-1.718***	-1.969***
						(0.420)	(0.451)	(0.602)
BGO Not Rec / Withdrawn						-0.865**	-0.720*	-1.154*
						(0.384)	(0.416)	(0.612)
BGO Not Observed						-2.370***	-2.334***	-1.988*
						(0.641)	(0.730)	(1.026)
RAB Points / 100							0.048***	0.053***
							(0.002)	(0.003)
Constant	-0.966***	-1.379***	-20.845***	-23.234***	-29.652***	-28.828***	-29.483***	-31.381***
	(0.043)	(0.094)	(0.436)	(0.618)	(0.797)	(0.809)	(0.850)	(1.103)
Observations	12,304	12,304	12,300	12,300	12,300	12,300	12,300	7,617
Pseudo R^2	0.026	0.042	0.349	0.355	0.499	0.507	0.537	0.561

Source: Table D.82R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Standard errors below each coefficient in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. There are 4 observations with missing CFA score that get dropped in Models 3 and on. Model 8 restricts to observations with no missing values for SAT scores, Household income, private high school, or percent of high school attending 4-year colleges. For models that include WPM components × Class≥2025, we only interact the WPM components whose weights changed—SAT scores, HS class rank, and extracurriculars

Online Appendix Table A.9: Complete Logit Estimates of USNA Admissions, Classes of 2023–2024, Removing Blue Chip Athletes and Prep Pool

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Asian	0.935***	1.010***	1.151***	1.579***	1.614***	1.349***	1.360***
	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.127)	(0.148)	(0.150)	(0.155)	(0.187)
Black	0.019	0.161	1.876***	2.526***	2.540***	2.692***	2.963***
	(0.120)	(0.123)	(0.171)	(0.204)	(0.206)	(0.215)	(0.269)
Declined/Missing	-0.171	-0.121	-0.479	-0.320	-0.371	-0.478	-0.551
	(0.233)	(0.236)	(0.318)	(0.384)	(0.392)	(0.407)	(0.573)
Hispanic	-0.111	0.039	0.742***	0.981***	0.961***	0.919***	0.980***
	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.122)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.149)	(0.174)
Native American / Hawaiian	0.338*	0.485***	1.186***	1.321***	1.410***	1.609***	1.829***
	(0.181)	(0.185)	(0.254)	(0.296)	(0.304)	(0.326)	(0.411)
Female=1	0.259***	0.264***	0.315***	0.269***	0.243**	0.121	0.160
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.088)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.109)	(0.130)
Graduating Class=2024	0.197***	0.195***	0.321***	0.369***	0.391***	0.388***	0.315***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.093)	(0.110)
First Generation College=1		-0.794***	-0.153	-0.405	-0.393	-0.854***	-1.138***
		(0.169)	(0.222)	(0.254)	(0.253)	(0.268)	(0.331)
HH Income <80,000=1		-0.329***	0.156	0.036	0.045	-0.168	0.038
		(0.082)	(0.109)	(0.129)	(0.131)	(0.137)	(0.161)
Missing HH Income=1		-0.282**	-0.043	0.107	0.072	-0.033	
		(0.110)	(0.146)	(0.168)	(0.171)	(0.177)	
Pct of HS attending 4yr College / 100		0.490***	0.806***	1.286***	1.296***	-0.193	-0.387
		(0.150)	(0.210)	(0.251)	(0.254)	(0.279)	(0.353)
Private HS		0.022	0.541***	0.357**	0.348**	0.213	0.235
		(0.098)	(0.130)	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.159)	(0.175)
Pct FRPL		-0.037	0.297	-0.181	-0.159	-0.461	-0.693**

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Online Appendix Table A.9 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
		(0.173)	(0.225)	(0.270)	(0.273)	(0.281)	(0.309)
Avg IRS Zip Code Salary / 100,000		-0.003	0.022	0.058	0.074	0.048	0.055
		(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.087)
Missing Pct of HS attending 4yr College=1		-0.644**	-0.761**	-1.465***	-1.546***	-1.258***	
		(0.252)	(0.306)	(0.420)	(0.432)	(0.442)	
Missing Private HS status=1		-0.079	0.125	-0.051	-0.005	-0.007	
		(0.137)	(0.178)	(0.213)	(0.216)	(0.228)	
Missing HS Pct FRPL=1		-0.012	0.023	0.026	0.055	-0.000	
		(0.095)	(0.123)	(0.143)	(0.145)	(0.151)	
Missing Avg IRS Zip Code Salary=1		-0.452**	-0.221	-0.273	-0.228	-0.368	
		(0.187)	(0.239)	(0.282)	(0.283)	(0.297)	
SAT Math / 100			1.012***	1.297***	1.290***	1.340***	1.333***
			(0.068)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.108)
SAT Verbal / 100			0.745***	0.836***	0.806***	0.939***	0.974***
			(0.067)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.103)
WPM SRIC / 100			0.467***	0.599***	0.595***	0.696***	0.700***
			(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.051)
WPM Athletic / 100			0.300***	0.369***	0.365***	0.448***	0.486***
			(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.036)
WPM Non-Athletic / 100			0.180***	0.228***	0.218***	0.213***	0.223***
			(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.028)
WPM Combined RSO / 100			0.471***	0.618***	0.624***	0.669***	0.672***
			(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.054)
CFA / 100			0.386***	0.509***	0.479***	-0.104	-0.059
			(0.049)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.089)
1+ Congressional Noms=1				0.203	0.197	0.217	0.288
				(0.255)	(0.262)	(0.270)	(0.315)

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Online Appendix Table A.9 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
2+ Congressional Noms=1				0.668***	0.696***	0.766***	0.874***
				(0.189)	(0.193)	(0.198)	(0.238)
SECNAV (Regular) Nom=1				1.418***	0.979**	1.992***	2.021***
				(0.447)	(0.458)	(0.485)	(0.736)
CDV / Medal of Honor Nom=1				1.772***	1.948***	2.229***	1.980***
				(0.348)	(0.356)	(0.373)	(0.485)
Applying from Nuclear Power School=1				1.541***	1.527***	1.497**	1.135
				(0.564)	(0.564)	(0.586)	(1.047)
Nom on 1+ Type 1 slates				11.220***	11.503***	13.519***	14.443***
				(1.441)	(1.449)	(1.507)	(1.804)
Nom on 1+ Type 2 slates				5.069***	5.007***	5.325***	4.772***
				(1.845)	(1.838)	(1.770)	(1.791)
Nom on Principal slate (not principal)				-0.286	-0.290	-0.238	-0.252
				(0.196)	(0.198)	(0.202)	(0.241)
Principal on 1+ slates				4.886***	4.955***	5.326***	5.190***
				(0.216)	(0.220)	(0.234)	(0.279)
Within 4000 WPM points on Type 1 slate				0.106	0.075	-0.033	-0.065
				(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.159)
Within 4000 WPM points on Type 2 slate				0.680***	0.624**	0.338	0.116
				(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.259)	(0.285)
Max WPM on slate & 4000+ above all others				1.266***	1.268***	0.650**	1.125**
				(0.297)	(0.302)	(0.317)	(0.437)
log (no. Type 1 competitors + 1)				-0.598***	-0.601***	-0.847***	-0.851***
				(0.174)	(0.177)	(0.185)	(0.226)
log (no. Type 2 competitors + 1)				-1.464***	-1.517***	-1.647***	-1.809***
				(0.234)	(0.236)	(0.243)	(0.280)
min of Avg (WPM / 10,000) on Type 1 slates				-1.440***	-1.480***	-1.692***	-1.825***

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Online Appendix Table A.9 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
				(0.207)	(0.208)	(0.216)	(0.256)
min of Avg (WPM / 10,000) on Type 2 slates				-0.217	-0.186	-0.165	-0.009
				(0.287)	(0.286)	(0.276)	(0.281)
TotalNominations=2				-0.200	-0.244*	-0.292*	-0.331*
				(0.139)	(0.144)	(0.150)	(0.180)
TotalNominations=3				-0.065	-0.199	-0.306	-0.367
				(0.232)	(0.238)	(0.245)	(0.298)
TotalNominations=4				0.460	0.339	-0.207	0.032
				(0.510)	(0.535)	(0.548)	(0.688)
TotalNominations=5				3.506	3.168	2.891	
				(2.502)	(2.222)	(3.351)	
Legacy (USNA)=1					0.422**	0.230	0.217
					(0.200)	(0.209)	(0.244)
Legacy (non-USNA Svc Academy)=1					-0.646***	-0.794***	-0.570*
					(0.245)	(0.258)	(0.303)
Any RAB for AP, IB, or Honors courses=1					0.079	-0.146	-0.135
					(0.094)	(0.099)	(0.119)
BGO Top 25 pct					-0.440***	-0.158	-0.212
					(0.106)	(0.111)	(0.132)
BGO Above Average					-0.689***	-0.325**	-0.364*
					(0.157)	(0.164)	(0.195)
BGO Average					-0.632***	-0.277	-0.339
					(0.218)	(0.227)	(0.274)
BGO Below Average					-2.630***	-2.990***	-2.699***
					(0.664)	(0.731)	(0.928)
BGO Not Rec / Withdrawn					-1.582***	-1.902***	-1.263
					(0.560)	(0.614)	(0.799)

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Online Appendix Table A.9 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
BGO Not Observed					-1.148	-1.048	0.306
					(1.115)	(1.280)	(1.165)
RAB Points / 100						0.053***	0.053***
						(0.004)	(0.005)
Constant	-0.963***	-1.176***	-23.540***	-30.251***	-29.481***	-30.227***	-30.928***
	(0.048)	(0.131)	(0.704)	(0.999)	(1.016)	(1.081)	(1.322)
Observations	5,753	5,753	5,752	5,752	5,752	5,752	4,063
Pseudo R^2	0.020	0.035	0.387	0.537	0.546	0.577	0.583

Source: Table D.84R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Standard errors below each coefficient in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. There is 1 observation with missing CFA score that gets dropped in Models 3 and on. Model 7 restricts to observations with no missing values for SAT scores, Household income, private high school, or percent of high school attending 4-year colleges.

Online Appendix Table A.10: Complete Logit Estimates of USNA Admissions, Classes of 2025–2027, Removing Blue Chip Athletes and Prep Pool

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Asian	0.581***	0.627***	0.819***	1.311***	1.375***	1.175***	1.636***
	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.097)	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.166)
Black	0.030	0.221**	2.077***	3.253***	3.326***	3.443***	4.955***
	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.147)	(0.178)	(0.181)	(0.189)	(0.328)
Declined/Missing	-0.067	-0.038	0.173	0.198	0.224	0.254	0.102
	(0.186)	(0.190)	(0.232)	(0.277)	(0.282)	(0.288)	(0.463)
Hispanic	0.055	0.144*	0.907***	1.352***	1.395***	1.339***	1.695***
	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.104)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.125)	(0.179)
Native American / Hawaiian	0.096	0.166	0.814***	1.147***	1.201***	1.191***	1.778***
	(0.169)	(0.171)	(0.222)	(0.249)	(0.253)	(0.263)	(0.387)
Female=1	0.379***	0.416***	0.363***	0.492***	0.410***	0.245***	0.051
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.074)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.127)
Graduating Class=2026	-0.009	0.016	0.239***	0.284***	0.297***	0.423***	0.599***
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.082)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.102)	(0.146)
Graduating Class=2027	-0.393***	-0.433***	-0.282***	-0.214**	-0.212**	-0.232**	-0.304**
	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.080)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.138)
First Generation College=1		-0.326**	0.228	0.329*	0.355*	-0.144	-0.531*
		(0.132)	(0.163)	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.201)	(0.310)
HH Income <80,000=1		-0.376***	0.002	-0.227**	-0.206*	-0.413***	-0.369**
		(0.073)	(0.091)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.115)	(0.160)
Missing HH Income=1		-0.220***	-0.120	-0.164	-0.182	-0.248*	
		(0.085)	(0.106)	(0.124)	(0.126)	(0.130)	
Pct of HS attending 4yr College / 100		0.629***	0.573***	1.129***	1.166***	-0.100	-0.281
		(0.129)	(0.163)	(0.192)	(0.194)	(0.215)	(0.340)
Private HS		0.181*	0.389***	0.259*	0.252*	0.103	0.112

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Online Appendix Table A.10 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
		(0.097)	(0.120)	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.144)	(0.176)
Pct FRPL		0.710***	0.715***	0.441*	0.465*	0.287	-0.178
		(0.176)	(0.220)	(0.254)	(0.257)	(0.266)	(0.315)
Avg IRS Zip Code Salary / 100,000		0.064	-0.037	-0.003	0.012	-0.041	-0.092
		(0.049)	(0.059)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.091)
Missing Pct of HS attending 4yr College=1		-0.237	0.073	0.241	0.270	0.415*	
		(0.149)	(0.188)	(0.223)	(0.225)	(0.236)	
Missing Private HS status=1		-0.564*	-0.565	-1.002**	-1.060***	-1.018**	
		(0.288)	(0.354)	(0.404)	(0.410)	(0.428)	
Missing HS Pct FRPL=1		0.010	0.082	0.025	0.036	0.015	
		(0.095)	(0.119)	(0.136)	(0.138)	(0.142)	
Missing Avg IRS Zip Code Salary=1		0.102	0.370	0.516	0.575	0.527	
		(0.275)	(0.338)	(0.384)	(0.389)	(0.406)	
SAT Math / 100			0.709***	0.889***	0.849***	0.841***	0.774***
			(0.063)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.112)
SAT Verbal / 100			0.413***	0.406***	0.359***	0.425***	0.403***
			(0.069)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.120)
WPM SRIC / 100			0.492***	0.612***	0.613***	0.669***	0.764***
			(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.060)
WPM Athletic / 100			0.328***	0.445***	0.439***	0.490***	0.610***
			(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.040)
WPM Non-Athletic / 100			0.297***	0.388***	0.374***	0.402***	0.481***
			(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.040)
WPM Combined RSO / 100			0.370***	0.459***	0.454***	0.492***	0.534***
			(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.050)
CFA / 100			0.305***	0.381***	0.369***	-0.077	-0.176**
			(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.084)

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Online Appendix Table A.10 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Missing SAT			4.402***	5.010***	4.721***	5.086***	
			(0.416)	(0.484)	(0.491)	(0.507)	
1+ Congressional Noms=1				0.190	0.214	0.232	0.377
				(0.219)	(0.222)	(0.229)	(0.320)
2+ Congressional Noms=1				0.085	0.163	0.301*	0.352
				(0.160)	(0.163)	(0.169)	(0.237)
SECNAV (Regular) Nom=1				0.846***	0.537	1.209***	1.991***
				(0.328)	(0.338)	(0.349)	(0.621)
CDV / Medal of Honor Nom=1				0.651***	0.655***	0.777***	0.859**
				(0.242)	(0.245)	(0.253)	(0.355)
Applying from Nuclear Power School=1				4.353***	4.334***	4.592***	6.062***
				(0.508)	(0.508)	(0.540)	(1.401)
Nom on 1+ Type 1 slates				8.114***	8.636***	10.197***	13.720***
				(1.118)	(1.135)	(1.181)	(1.720)
Nom on 1+ Type 2 slates				3.508***	3.597***	4.357***	3.454**
				(1.045)	(1.056)	(0.971)	(1.476)
Nom on Principal slate (not principal)				-0.144	-0.137	-0.100	-0.256
				(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.180)	(0.262)
Principal on 1+ slates				4.161***	4.208***	4.504***	5.550***
				(0.177)	(0.179)	(0.189)	(0.312)
Within 4000 WPM points on Type 1 slate				0.169	0.139	0.006	-0.107
				(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.151)
Within 4000 WPM points on Type 2 slate				0.417*	0.414*	0.167	0.118
				(0.223)	(0.225)	(0.231)	(0.324)
Max WPM on slate & 4000+ above all others				1.468***	1.411***	0.933***	1.777***
				(0.270)	(0.273)	(0.283)	(0.525)
log (no. Type 1 competitors + 1)				-0.703***	-0.735***	-0.894***	-1.109***

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Online Appendix Table A.10 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
				(0.125)	(0.127)	(0.131)	(0.188)
log (no. Type 2 competitors + 1)				-1.237***	-1.277***	-1.474***	-1.373***
				(0.180)	(0.182)	(0.189)	(0.259)
min of Avg (WPM / 10,000) on Type 1 slates				-0.976***	-1.040***	-1.212***	-1.684***
				(0.161)	(0.163)	(0.169)	(0.244)
min of Avg (WPM / 10,000) on Type 2 slates				-0.042	-0.038	-0.067	0.051
				(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.151)	(0.226)
TotalNominations=2				0.249**	0.157	0.041	0.187
				(0.117)	(0.121)	(0.126)	(0.174)
TotalNominations=3				0.777***	0.626***	0.451**	0.499*
				(0.202)	(0.208)	(0.216)	(0.296)
TotalNominations=4				1.035***	0.867**	0.416	0.495
				(0.377)	(0.390)	(0.409)	(0.594)
TotalNominations=5				2.250	1.517	1.593	
				(1.769)	(1.661)	(1.916)	
Legacy (USNA)=1					0.680***	0.528***	0.356
					(0.187)	(0.193)	(0.252)
Legacy (non-USNA Svc Academy)=1					-0.138	-0.253	-0.268
					(0.207)	(0.217)	(0.303)
Any RAB for AP, IB, or Honors courses=1					0.241***	0.075	0.152
					(0.078)	(0.082)	(0.117)
BGO Top 25 pct					-0.362***	-0.146	-0.303**
					(0.097)	(0.101)	(0.142)
BGO Above Average					-0.569***	-0.268*	-0.453**
					(0.136)	(0.142)	(0.206)
BGO Average					-0.969***	-0.708***	-1.134***
					(0.200)	(0.208)	(0.293)

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Online Appendix Table A.10 – continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
BGO Below Average					-1.369**	-0.907	-1.636**
					(0.559)	(0.590)	(0.802)
BGO Not Rec / Withdrawn					-0.225	0.206	-1.137
					(0.532)	(0.542)	(0.937)
BGO Not Observed					-2.913***	-2.974***	-4.267***
					(0.767)	(0.892)	(1.451)
RAB Points / 100						0.046***	0.054***
						(0.003)	(0.004)
Constant	-0.319***	-0.807***	-18.005***	-23.339***	-22.478***	-22.490***	-23.585***
	(0.051)	(0.126)	(0.545)	(0.725)	(0.739)	(0.769)	(1.118)
Observations	6,551	6,551	6,548	6,548	6,548	6,548	3,554
Pseudo R^2	0.018	0.038	0.323	0.473	0.482	0.512	0.543

Source: Table D.85R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Standard errors below each coefficient in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. There are 3 observations with missing CFA scores that get dropped in Models 3 and on. Model 7 restricts to observations with no missing values for SAT scores, Household income, private high school, or percent of high school attending 4-year colleges.

Online Appendix Table A.11: Nested Logit Component Estimates of Admission Channel

	QA	AA	$CC = 1$	$CC = 0$
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Asian	0.233	1.103***	1.318***	0.600**
	(0.170)	(0.280)	(0.098)	(0.264)
Black	0.893**	2.216***	2.298***	2.310***
	(0.404)	(0.322)	(0.166)	(0.280)
Declined/Missing	0.174	-1.375	0.085	-0.166
	(0.484)	(1.343)	(0.251)	(0.610)
Hispanic	-0.033	1.063***	1.091***	0.908***
	(0.222)	(0.279)	(0.099)	(0.247)
Native American / Hawaiian	-0.173	0.531	1.096***	1.752***
	(0.401)	(0.586)	(0.201)	(0.542)
Female=1	0.155	0.435*	0.302***	-0.058
	(0.138)	(0.234)	(0.071)	(0.211)
First Generation College=1	0.587	0.175	-0.053	0.701**
	(0.365)	(0.519)	(0.162)	(0.354)
HH Income <80,000=1	0.109	0.449*	-0.129	0.457**
	(0.184)	(0.269)	(0.089)	(0.221)
Missing HH Income=1	0.219	0.175	-0.164	0.722**
	(0.224)	(0.363)	(0.107)	(0.284)
SAT Math / 100	0.861***	-0.189	1.293***	1.084***
	(0.204)	(0.319)	(0.083)	(0.225)
SAT Verbal / 100	0.075	0.413	0.796***	0.575***
	(0.191)	(0.306)	(0.083)	(0.223)
WPM SRIC / 100	0.223**	-0.146	0.567***	0.566***
	(0.104)	(0.123)	(0.036)	(0.098)
WPM Athletic / 100	0.083	-0.174	0.374***	0.353***
	(0.051)	(0.123)	(0.028)	(0.076)
WPM Non-Athletic / 100	0.095**	-0.127	0.224***	0.057
	(0.044)	(0.115)	(0.023)	(0.062)
WPM Combined RSO / 100	0.102	-0.007	0.530***	0.215***
	(0.073)	(0.090)	(0.027)	(0.067)
CFA / 100	0.179**	-0.008	0.423***	0.225**
	(0.087)	(0.132)	(0.040)	(0.109)
Missing SAT	1.915	-0.659	4.637***	
	(1.289)	(1.654)	(0.525)	
1[Class≥2025]=1 × SAT Math / 100	-0.601**	0.147	-0.534***	0.349
	(0.253)	(0.393)	(0.108)	(0.296)

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Online Appendix Table A.11 – Continued from previous page

	QA	AA	$CC = 1$	$CC = 0$
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
1[Class≥2025]=1 × SAT Verbal / 100	-0.235	-0.353	-0.406***	-0.295
	(0.260)	(0.429)	(0.116)	(0.303)
1[Class≥2025]=1 × WPM SRIC / 100	0.092	0.063	0.056	-0.157
	(0.182)	(0.170)	(0.051)	(0.127)
1[Class≥2025]=1 × WPM Athletic / 100	0.066	-0.053	0.067*	-0.024
	(0.066)	(0.158)	(0.037)	(0.097)
1[Class≥2025]=1 × WPM Non-Athletic / 100	0.101*	-0.053	0.150***	0.090
	(0.060)	(0.169)	(0.036)	(0.109)
Nom on 1+ Type 1 slates	-11.712***	-18.121***	12.367***	
	(1.898)	(3.103)	(0.959)	
Nom on 1+ Type 2 slates	-12.363***	-30.699***	5.113***	
	(4.128)	(8.543)	(0.882)	
Nom on Principal slate (not principal)	0.281	-0.580	-0.367***	
	(0.262)	(0.487)	(0.132)	
Principal on 1+ slates	-6.173***		5.230***	
	(0.610)		(0.172)	
Within 4000 WPM points on Type 1 slate	-0.058	-0.125	0.136	
	(0.155)	(0.287)	(0.083)	
Within 4000 WPM points on Type 2 slate	-0.698*	-0.895	0.679***	
	(0.376)	(0.792)	(0.171)	
Max WPM on slate & 4000+ above all others	-0.157	-0.699	1.233***	
	(0.200)	(1.092)	(0.199)	
log (no. Type 1 competitors + 1)	1.502***	2.623***	-1.001***	
	(0.229)	(0.358)	(0.110)	
log (no. Type 2 competitors + 1)	1.175***	3.074***	-1.690***	
	(0.302)	(0.634)	(0.149)	
min of Avg (WPM / 10,000) on Type 1 slates	1.051***	1.661***	-1.461***	
	(0.266)	(0.447)	(0.133)	
min of Avg (WPM / 10,000) on Type 2 slates	1.138*	3.257***	-0.104	
	(0.589)	(1.217)	(0.135)	
2+ Congressional Noms=1	-0.874***	-0.574*	0.495***	
	(0.190)	(0.314)	(0.128)	
Graduating Class=2024	-0.217	0.626*	0.323***	0.374
	(0.190)	(0.355)	(0.093)	(0.263)
Graduating Class=2025	5.074**	2.687	5.896***	1.352
	(2.552)	(3.494)	(0.912)	(2.062)
Graduating Class=2026	5.005**	3.044	6.111***	1.827

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Online Appendix Table A.11 – Continued from previous page

	QA	AA	$CC = 1$	$CC = 0$
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	(2.546)	(3.497)	(0.909)	(2.026)
Graduating Class=2027	4.708*	2.485	5.721***	1.383
	(2.543)	(3.487)	(0.910)	(2.035)
Pct of HS attending 4yr College / 100			1.270***	0.153
			(0.162)	(0.472)
Private HS			0.283***	0.566*
			(0.108)	(0.335)
Pct FRPL			0.143	-0.029
			(0.195)	(0.605)
Avg IRS Zip Code Salary / 100,000			0.030	-0.419*
			(0.053)	(0.242)
Missing Pct of HS attending 4yr College=1			-0.358*	0.726*
			(0.211)	(0.422)
Missing Private HS status=1			-0.317*	0.453
			(0.183)	(0.487)
Missing HS Pct FRPL=1			0.053	0.027
			(0.103)	(0.381)
Missing Avg IRS Zip Code Salary=1			-0.070	-0.900**
			(0.169)	(0.402)
SECNAV (Regular) Nom=1			1.234***	
			(0.467)	
CDV / Medal of Honor Nom=1			1.028***	
			(0.265)	
Applying from Nuclear Power School=1			2.824**	
			(1.185)	
TotalNominations=2			0.001	
			(0.097)	
TotalNominations=3			0.298*	
			(0.160)	
TotalNominations=4			0.675**	
			(0.320)	
TotalNominations=5			2.683*	
			(1.382)	
Legacy (USNA)=1			0.418***	0.680**
			(0.152)	(0.277)
Legacy (non-USNA Svc Academy)=1			-0.189	-1.101***
			(0.178)	(0.333)

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Online Appendix Table A.11 – Continued from previous page

	QA	AA	$CC = 1$	$CC = 0$
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Any RAB for AP, IB, or Honors courses=1			0.142**	0.357**
			(0.063)	(0.178)
BGO Top 25 pct			-0.397***	
			(0.074)	
BGO Above Average			-0.586***	
			(0.107)	
BGO Average			-0.787***	
			(0.153)	
BGO Below Average			-1.867***	
			(0.419)	
BGO Not Rec / Withdrawn			-0.623	
			(0.393)	
BGO Not Observed			-1.979***	
			(0.651)	
Inclusive Value			0.637***	
			(0.080)	
Constant	-9.752***	0.634	-29.007***	-21.028***
	(2.222)	(3.228)	(0.887)	(1.818)
Subsamples:				
QA or Slate Winner (SW) above QA WPM cutoff	✓			
AA or SW below QA WPM cutoff		✓		
All Congressional nominees (incl. declines)			✓	
All Non-Congressional Nominees				✓
Observations	2,008	941	10,743	1,536
Pseudo R^2	0.337	0.440	0.511	0.387

Source: Table D.86R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Standard errors below each coefficient in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All models exclude Blue Chip Athletes and applicants coming from Prep Pool. Models 1–3 constitute a nested logit for congressional nominees. Model 1 estimates the channel choice (QA vs. slate winner) among matriculants with WPM scores above the final QA cutoff. Model 2 estimates the channel choice (AA vs. slate winner) among matriculants with WPM scores below the final QA cutoff. Because the channel is only observed for matriculants, we exclude from both models all admitted applicants who declined an offer of admission. Model 3 estimates admission of all congressional nominees (including matriculants, declines, and rejects) and incorporates the lower-nest estimates of Models 1 and 2 via the inclusive value parameter. Model 4 estimates a separate binary admissions logit for all service-connected nominees without congressional nominations.

Online Appendix Table A.12: Average Marginal Effects: USNA Admissions, Taking into Account Admission Channels

	Admit Rate (%) w/Racial Prefs	Admit Rate (%) w/o Racial Prefs	Average Marginal Effect (pct pt)
Black	37.6	13.7	23.9
Hispanic	35.9	24.5	11.4
Asian	55.0	38.4	16.7
Native American / Hawaiian	41.4	29.1	12.3

Source: Table D.87R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Note: This table compares AMEs from the pooled nested logit model specification that takes into account the different admissions channels. The admission probabilities in the first column mechanically match the raw admit rates for the given subsample.

Online Appendix Table A.13: Original and Final QA Cutoffs by Class Year

Class Year	Highest QA Cutoff	Actual QA Cutoff	N QA Winners, Low WPM
2023	75,479	72,056	68
2024	75,475	70,461	85
2025	74,020	71,353	48
2026	74,180	70,911	60
2027	74,851	70,478	74

Source: Table 4.5R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: 'N QA Winners, Low WPM' is a count of the number of candidates who won a Qualified Alternate slot with a WPM below the highest QA cutoff. Applicants must be above the final QA threshold to be included in the sample.

Online Appendix Table A.14: Complete Logit Estimates of USNA Qualified Alternate Admissions, Non-BCA, Non-Prep Sample

	Eligible for QA			WPM near QA cutoff		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Asian	0.925***	3.128***	3.081***	2.397***	3.571***	3.509***
	(0.112)	(0.310)	(0.312)	(0.250)	(0.364)	(0.366)
Black	0.224	3.501***	3.470***	2.766***	4.120***	4.062***
	(0.229)	(0.578)	(0.581)	(0.652)	(0.783)	(0.785)
Declined/Missing	-0.149	-0.781	-0.684	-0.605	-0.929	-0.817
	(0.356)	(0.832)	(0.841)	(0.798)	(0.963)	(0.973)
Hispanic	-0.018	2.199***	2.194***	1.509***	2.444***	2.435***
	(0.154)	(0.402)	(0.404)	(0.340)	(0.443)	(0.444)
Native American / Hawaiian	0.377	2.680***	2.705***	1.403**	2.745***	2.786***
	(0.298)	(0.637)	(0.633)	(0.590)	(0.731)	(0.728)
Female=1	0.545***	0.640***	0.632***	0.416**	0.601**	0.595**
	(0.091)	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.195)	(0.250)	(0.250)
Graduating Class=2024	0.108	1.455***	1.468***	0.119	1.243***	1.268***
	(0.134)	(0.337)	(0.338)	(0.260)	(0.355)	(0.357)
Graduating Class=2025	0.619***	2.049***	2.036***	0.300	1.952***	1.949***
	(0.133)	(0.367)	(0.368)	(0.307)	(0.415)	(0.416)
Graduating Class=2026	0.552***	3.405***	3.441***	1.038***	3.514***	3.556***
	(0.134)	(0.401)	(0.402)	(0.309)	(0.464)	(0.466)
Graduating Class=2027	0.237*	1.964***	1.955***	-0.261	1.525***	1.527***
	(0.134)	(0.343)	(0.344)	(0.268)	(0.371)	(0.372)
First Generation College=1		0.077	-0.050		0.101	-0.028
		(0.562)	(0.577)		(0.641)	(0.654)
HH Income <80,000=1		0.107	0.076		0.082	0.040
		(0.300)	(0.302)		(0.332)	(0.334)
Missing HH Income=1		0.185	0.181		0.007	-0.004

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Online Appendix Table A.14 – Continued from previous page

	Eligible for QA			WPM near QA cutoff		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
		(0.348)	(0.348)		(0.373)	(0.373)
Pct of HS attending 4yr College		0.001	-0.001		0.001	-0.001
		(0.005)	(0.006)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Private HS × 100		0.000	0.000		0.001	0.001
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Pct FRPL		-0.004	-0.004		-0.003	-0.003
		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.008)	(0.008)
Avg IRS Zip Code Salary / 10,000		0.003*	0.003		0.003	0.003
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)
Missing Pct of HS attending 4yr College=1		-0.079	-0.144		0.290	0.258
		(0.952)	(0.963)		(1.111)	(1.121)
Missing Private HS status=1		-0.102	-0.079		0.014	0.050
		(0.712)	(0.711)		(0.725)	(0.723)
Missing HS Pct FRPL=1		0.138	0.127		0.129	0.110
		(0.351)	(0.352)		(0.363)	(0.364)
Missing Avg IRS Zip Code Salary=1		-0.074	-0.109		-0.100	-0.149
		(0.659)	(0.657)		(0.681)	(0.679)
WPM Above Initial QA Cutoff		1.001	0.991			
		(0.658)	(0.658)			
WPM Score		0.174***	0.173***		0.145***	0.144***
		(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.013)	(0.013)
CFA / 100		-0.169	-0.255		-0.193	-0.287*
		(0.143)	(0.160)		(0.151)	(0.171)
Legacy (USNA)=1		0.671	0.655		0.883*	0.858*
		(0.429)	(0.428)		(0.467)	(0.469)
Legacy (non-USNA Svc Academy)=1		-0.484	-0.496		-0.561	-0.585

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Online Appendix Table A.14 – Continued from previous page

	Eligible for QA			WPM near QA cutoff		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
		(0.584)	(0.585)		(0.617)	(0.620)
Any RAB for AP, IB, or Honors courses=1		0.157	0.155		0.087	0.088
		(0.228)	(0.228)		(0.247)	(0.247)
BGO Top 25 pct		-0.146	-0.103		-0.381	-0.337
		(0.245)	(0.248)		(0.259)	(0.263)
BGO Above Average		-0.281	-0.227		-0.719	-0.648
		(0.414)	(0.418)		(0.461)	(0.465)
BGO Average		-0.303	-0.307		-0.708	-0.727
		(0.581)	(0.579)		(0.628)	(0.627)
BGO Below Average		-0.663	-0.547		-1.206	-1.064
		(1.624)	(1.632)		(2.113)	(2.131)
BGO Not Rec / Withdrawn		-1.746	-1.712			
		(3.758)	(3.756)			
BGO Not Observed		-3.873	-3.756			
		(5.943)	(5.986)			
RAB Points / 100			0.009			0.010
			(0.007)			(0.008)
Constant	-2.492***	-129.553***	-128.857***	-1.464***	-107.064***	-106.990***
	(0.101)	(7.832)	(7.845)	(0.212)	(9.226)	(9.255)
Observations	5,091	5,077	5,077	753	751	751
Pseudo R^2	0.036	0.833	0.833	0.183	0.439	0.441

Source: Table A.2 of Trial Exhibit P518.

Notes: Standard errors below each coefficient in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Model estimated on Classes of 2023–2027. Columns 1–3 include all applicants eligible for QA admission except for excluding Blue Chip Athletes and applicants from Prep Schools. Columns 4–6 further restrict the sample to individuals whose WPM scores are between their respective year's initial and final QA thresholds.

Online Appendix Table A.15: Complete Logit Estimates of NAPS Admissions

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Asian	0.879***	0.814***	1.049***	1.090	0.790***
	(0.139)	(0.168)	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.269)
Black	2.907***	2.908***	2.864***	2.874***	2.441***
	(0.118)	(0.140)	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.187)
Declined/Missing	-0.049	-0.359	-0.247	-0.217	-0.153
	(0.397)	(0.478)	(0.482)	(0.480)	(0.477)
Hispanic	1.548***	1.334***	1.227***	1.231***	0.867***
	(0.105)	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.173)
Native American / Hawaiian	1.483***	1.362***	1.354***	1.418***	1.079***
	(0.221)	(0.256)	(0.269)	(0.270)	(0.368)
Female=1	0.602***	0.866***	0.698***	0.678***	0.691***
	(0.089)	(0.103)	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.113)
GotNomination=1	1.064***	0.438***	0.497***	0.485	0.506***
	(0.126)	(0.138)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.148)
Graduating Class=2024	0.101	0.067	0.043	0.074	0.082
	(0.114)	(0.128)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.132)
Graduating Class=2025	0.918***	0.444***	0.537***	0.529***	0.032
	(0.117)	(0.151)	(0.165)	(0.167)	(0.201)
Graduating Class=2026	0.958***	0.267*	0.313*	0.311*	-0.181
	(0.115)	(0.153)	(0.161)	(0.163)	(0.198)
First Generation College=1		0.356**	0.292*	0.256	0.229
		(0.164)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.169)
HH Income ¡80,000=1		0.166	0.103	0.116	0.135
		(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.119)
Missing HH Income=1		-0.226	-0.191	-0.175	-0.199
		(0.174)	(0.179)	(0.180)	(0.184)

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Online Appendix Table A.15 – Continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Pct of HS attending 4yr College / 100		-0.843***	-0.284	-0.279	-0.306
		(0.218)	(0.232)	(0.233)	(0.235)
Private HS		0.761***	0.660***	0.660***	0.678***
		(0.208)	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.219)
Pct FRPL		1.541***	1.553***	1.554***	1.594***
		(0.300)	(0.315)	(0.315)	(0.315)
Avg IRS Zip Code Salary / 100,000		-0.028	0.184	0.205	0.217*
		(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)
Missing Pct of HS attending 4yr College=1		-0.973***	-0.829***	-0.829***	-0.884***
		(0.279)	(0.292)	(0.293)	(0.301)
Missing Private HS status=1		0.655***	0.709***	0.728***	0.704***
		(0.243)	(0.253)	(0.254)	(0.251)
Missing HS Pct FRPL=1		0.224	0.139	0.132	0.135
		(0.203)	(0.210)	(0.211)	(0.210)
Missing Avg IRS Zip Code Salary=1		1.034***	0.959***	0.933***	0.991***
		(0.192)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.201)
SECNAV (Regular) Nom=1		2.850***	2.914***	2.479***	2.446***
		(0.176)	(0.194)	(0.232)	(0.232)
CDV / Medal of Honor Nom=1		1.722***	1.557***	1.658***	1.708***
		(0.247)	(0.255)	(0.262)	(0.263)
Applying from Nuclear Power School=1		0.463	0.945**	0.947**	0.880**
		(0.337)	(0.372)	(0.373)	(0.367)
SAT Math / 100			9.165***	9.125***	9.309***
			(1.043)	(1.046)	(1.074)
SAT Verbal / 100			-0.224**	-0.239***	-0.249***
			(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.089)
WPM SRIC / 100			0.123***	0.124***	0.128***

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Online Appendix Table A.15 – Continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
			(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
WPM Athletic / 100			0.120***	0.116***	0.118***
			(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)
WPM Non-Athletic / 100			0.079**	0.069**	0.068**
			(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
WPM Combined RSO / 100			0.078**	0.075**	0.072**
			(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
CFA / 100			0.046	0.037	0.038
			(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Missing SAT			9.476***	9.376***	9.440***
			(1.417)	(1.425)	(1.464)
(SAT Math / 100)^2			-0.799***	-0.796***	-0.810***
			(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.089)
Legacy (USNA)=1				-0.363	-0.375
				(0.339)	(0.339)
Legacy (non-USNA Svc Academy)=1				-0.538	-0.534
				(0.387)	(0.392)
Any RAB for AP, IB, or Honors courses=1				-0.047	-0.031
				(0.111)	(0.112)
BGO Top 25 pct				-0.449***	-0.467
				(0.152)	(0.153)
BGO Above Average				-0.406**	-0.441**
				(0.182)	(0.184)
BGO Average				-0.460**	-0.493**
				(0.225)	(0.228)
BGO Below Average				-1.018***	-1.020***
				(0.375)	(0.379)

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Online Appendix Table A.15 – Continued from previous page

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
BGO Not Rec / Withdrawn				-0.947**	-1.029**
				(0.473)	(0.485)
Asian × 1[Class≥2025]=1					0.621*
					(0.357)
Black × 1[Class≥2025]=1					1.267***
					(0.301)
Hispanic × 1[Class≥2025]=1					0.833***
					(0.257)
Native American / Hawaiian × 1[Class≥2025]=1					0.754
					(0.545)
Constant	-4.350***	-4.562***	-31.509***	-30.766***	-31.119***
	(0.154)	(0.282)	(3.157)	(3.175)	(3.258)
Observations	7,307	7,307	7,264	7,264	7,264
Pseudo R^2	0.178	0.379	0.421	0.425	0.429

Source: Table D.88R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: Standard errors below each coefficient in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. There are a small number of observations with missing WPM components or CFA scores that get dropped in Models 3 and on. This table excludes from the primary NAPS admissions sample those who are Future Blue Chip Athletes, Class of 2027 application cycle, and those with missing BGO interviews.

Online Appendix Table A.16: Counterfactual Racial Numbers and Shares (%) without Racial Preferences, Full Analysis Sample

	Race/Ethnicity						
Scenario	Asian	Black	Declined/ Missing	Hispanic	Nat. Amer. / Hawaiian	White	Total
Panel A. Classes of 2023-24: Number of Admits							
Data	358	280	35	329	79	1,693	2,774
Model (Status Quo)	358	280	35	329	79	1,693	2,774
No Racial Prefs	288	224	41	298	68	1,855	2,774
No Racial or BCA Prefs	303	198	45	314	71	1,843	2,774
No Racial or Olympic BCA Prefs	298	219	44	309	71	1,833	2,774
No Racial or Prep Pool Prefs	290	169	41	259	67	1,948	2,774
No Racial, Prep Pool or BCA Prefs	314	101	44	289	60	1,966	2,774
No Racial, Prep Pool or Olympic BCA Prefs	302	164	42	278	69	1,920	2,774
Panel B. Classes of 2023-24: Share of Admitted Class							
Data	12.91	10.09	1.26	11.86	2.85	61.03	100.00
Model (Status Quo)	12.91	10.09	1.26	11.86	2.85	61.03	100.00
No Racial Prefs	10.38	8.07	1.48	10.74	2.45	66.87	100.00
No Racial or BCA Prefs	10.92	7.14	1.62	11.32	2.56	66.44	100.00
No Racial or Olympic BCA Prefs	10.74	7.89	1.59	11.14	2.56	66.08	100.00
No Racial or Prep Pool Prefs	10.45	6.09	1.48	9.34	2.42	70.22	100.00
No Racial, Prep Pool or BCA Prefs	11.32	3.64	1.59	10.42	2.16	70.87	100.00
No Racial, Prep Pool or Olympic BCA Prefs	10.89	5.91	1.51	10.02	2.49	69.21	100.00
Panel C. Classes of 2025-27: Number of Admits							
Data	628	447	57	534	103	2,363	4,132
Model (Status Quo)	628	448	57	534	103	2,363	4,133
No Racial Prefs	542	338	62	461	93	2,636	4,132
No Racial or BCA Prefs	558	316	66	479	96	2,616	4,132
No Racial or Olympic BCA Prefs	550	338	65	473	95	2,611	4,132
No Racial or Prep Pool Prefs	550	250	68	412	84	2,769	4,132
No Racial, Prep Pool or BCA Prefs	589	160	75	440	89	2,779	4,132
No Racial, Prep Pool or Olympic BCA Prefs	566	245	72	426	89	2,735	4,132
Panel D. Classes of 2025-27: Share of Admitted Class							
Data	15.20	10.82	1.38	12.92	2.49	57.19	100.00
Model (Status Quo)	15.19	10.84	1.38	12.92	2.49	57.17	100.00
No Racial Prefs	13.12	8.18	1.50	11.16	2.25	63.79	100.00
No Racial or BCA Prefs	13.50	7.65	1.60	11.59	2.32	63.31	100.00
No Racial or Olympic BCA Prefs	13.31	8.18	1.57	11.45	2.30	63.19	100.00
No Racial or Prep Pool Prefs	13.31	6.05	1.65	9.97	2.03	67.01	100.00
No Racial, Prep Pool or BCA Prefs	14.25	3.87	1.82	10.65	2.15	67.26	100.00
No Racial, Prep Pool or Olympic BCA Prefs	13.70	5.93	1.74	10.31	2.15	66.19	100.00

Source: Table 4.11R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: This table shows the results of the capacity constraints counterfactual analysis separately for the Classes of 2023–24 and 2025–27 on the subsample described in the table caption. In the Status Quo and No Racial Prefs scenarios, we treat Prep Pool and BCA admissions outcomes as fixed. When removing Racial and BCA preferences, we treat Prep Pool admissions outcomes as fixed. When removing Racial

Online Appendix Table A.17: Counterfactual Racial Numbers and Shares (%) with Racial Preferences, Full Analysis Sample

	Race/Ethnicity						
Scenario	Asian	Black	Declined/ Missing	Hispanic	Nat. Amer. / Hawaiian	White	Total
Panel A. Classes of 2023–24: Number of Admits							
Data	358	280	35	329	79	1,693	2,774
Model (Status Quo)	358	280	35	329	79	1,693	2,774
Racial but no BCA Prefs	375	266	38	349	83	1,664	2,774
Racial but no Olympic BCA Prefs	370	282	37	344	83	1,658	2,774
Racial but no Prep Pool Prefs	362	236	34	294	79	1,768	2,774
Racial but no Prep Pool or BCA Prefs	386	185	36	329	73	1,765	2,774
Racial but no Prep Pool or Olympic BCA Prefs	375	240	35	317	81	1,726	2,774
Panel B. Classes of 2023–24: Share of Admitted Class							
Data	12.91	10.09	1.26	11.86	2.85	61.03	100.00
Model (Status Quo)	12.91	10.09	1.26	11.86	2.85	61.03	100.00
Racial but no BCA Prefs	13.52	9.59	1.37	12.58	2.99	59.99	100.00
Racial but no Olympic BCA Prefs	13.34	10.17	1.33	12.40	2.99	59.77	100.00
Racial but no Prep Pool Prefs	13.05	8.51	1.23	10.60	2.85	63.73	100.00
Racial but no Prep Pool or BCA Prefs	13.91	6.67	1.30	11.86	2.63	63.63	100.00
Racial but no Prep Pool or Olympic BCA Prefs	13.52	8.65	1.26	11.43	2.92	62.22	100.00
Panel C. Classes of 2025–27: Number of Admits							
Data	628	447	57	534	103	2,363	4,132
Model (Status Quo)	628	448	57	534	103	2,363	4,133
Racial but no BCA Prefs	648	450	61	558	107	2,309	4,132
Racial but no Olympic BCA Prefs	641	461	59	552	106	2,313	4,132
Racial but no Prep Pool Prefs	633	405	61	491	95	2,446	4,132
Racial but no Prep Pool or BCA Prefs	670	364	68	522	99	2,409	4,132
Racial but no Prep Pool or Olympic BCA Prefs	652	419	65	510	100	2,386	4,132
Panel D. Classes of 2025–27: Share of Admitted Class							
Data	15.20	10.82	1.38	12.92	2.49	57.19	100.00
Model (Status Quo)	15.19	10.84	1.38	12.92	2.49	57.17	100.00
Racial but no BCA Prefs	15.68	10.89	1.48	13.50	2.59	55.88	100.00
Racial but no Olympic BCA Prefs	15.51	11.16	1.43	13.36	2.57	55.98	100.00
Racial but no Prep Pool Prefs	15.32	9.80	1.48	11.88	2.30	59.20	100.00
Racial but no Prep Pool or BCA Prefs	16.21	8.81	1.65	12.63	2.40	58.30	100.00
Racial but no Prep Pool or Olympic BCA Prefs	15.78	10.14	1.57	12.34	2.42	57.74	100.00

Source: Table D.93R of Trial Exhibit P222.

Notes: This table shows the results of the capacity constraints counterfactual analysis separately for the Classes of 2023–24 and 2025–27 on the subsample described in the table caption. In the Status Quo, I treat Prep Pool and BCA admissions outcomes as fixed. When removing BCA preferences, I treat Prep Pool admissions outcomes as fixed. When removing Prep Pool preferences, I treat BCA admissions outcomes as fixed. BCA stands for Blue Chip Athlete; Olympic BCA refers to all sports except for basketball and football; and Prep Pool refers to NAPS, Foundation Prep, or Civilian Prep.